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GLOBALIZATION OF WATER 
PRIVATIZATION: RAMIFICATIONS OF 
INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES IN THE  
“BLUE GOLD” ECONOMY 
JULIEN CHAISSE* 
MARINE POLO** 
Abstract: The world of water services changed significantly over the last two 
decades, opening it to new business possibilities as promoted by different in-
ternational financial institutions. Such prospects arose in the face of extraordi-
nary population growth and dire water expansion needs. Accordingly, a vast 
increase of water-services privatization contracts between foreign investors 
and states ensued. Today, 10 percent of global consumers receive water from 
private companies. Inevitably, disputes have emerged regarding these privati-
zation contracts, with little indication of subsiding anytime soon. In the ab-
sence of a specialized international regime to regulate these fast-growing ac-
tivities, both investors and host states filed twenty-one investment claims to 
investment tribunals in less than two decades. These filings have invited tri-
bunals to interpret foreign investments in the water industry. The tribunal in-
terpretations have generated the embryonic international regulatory and juris-
prudential regime on water services analysed in this Article. Governments 
must design water related policies that comply with investment treaties be-
cause failure to do so results in higher water costs and deters foreign investors 
from providing much needed high quality services to local populations and 
industries. Although the investment jurisprudence may be seen as progress 
towards the regulation of an important service, it also emphasizes the lack of a 
true global holistic approach to regulate water services. 
INTRODUCTION 
Water is often perceived as an infinite natural resource. Unfortunately, 
the tragic reality is it maintains a fixed invariable volume with less than 
three percent consisting of fresh water.1 Never before has the inherent ten-
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 1 Amy K. Miller, Note, Blue Rush: Is an International Privatization Agreement a Viable Solu-
tion for Developing Countries in the Face of an Impending World Water Crisis?, 16 IND. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 217, 223 (2005). 
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sion of scarcity versus overconsumption in the relationship between man 
and water reached such a critical point.2 Accordingly, Earth’s water supply 
faces many newfound demands and challenges in the years ahead.3 
Water, Earth’s “blue gold,” is its most precious and essential commodi-
ty. It is fundamental to all aspects of drinking, eating, maintaining hygiene, 
and promoting population health. Water is basic to the preservation of most 
ecosystems and crucial to a safe and long lasting environment. Moreover, it 
is critical to several types of businesses and industries.4 It not only main-
tains social stability and environmental sustainability, but also fosters eco-
nomic development across civilizations.5 Consequently, access to clean wa-
ter has been recognized by the United Nations (UN) as a basic human right 
that every government is obligated to provide.6  
The world of water services changed significantly in the late 1990s due 
to an extraordinary boom in global population growth.7 The sustained popu-
lation increase sparked a need for water services expansion.8 Opportunities 
for investment in water services and sanitation infrastructure attracted tre-
mendous support from a myriad of international financial institutions. 9 
These institutions unlocked a host of new business opportunities for the wa-
ter services and sanitation industry to address traditional problems ranging 
from fresh water scarcity to inadequate investment in sanitation infrastruc-
ture to the inability of many public authorities to meet coverage needs.10 
                                                                                                                           
 2 See id. at 223–24. 
 3 See Edith Brown Weiss & Lydia Slobodian, Virtual Water, Water Scarcity, and Interna-
tional Trade Law, 17 J. INT’L ECON. L. 717, 717 (2014). 
 4 Miller, supra note 1, at 217. 
 5 Id. at 221. 
 6 Sharmila L. Murthy, The Human Right(s) to Water and Sanitation: History, Meaning, and 
the Controversy Over-Privatization, 31 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 89, 89, 109 (2013). 
 7 See generally World Population Prospect: The 2006 Revision, Highlights (U.N. Dep’t of 
Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Population Division Working Paper No. ESA/WP.2002, 2007), available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2006/WPP2006_Highlights_rev.pdf, archived 
at https://perma.cc/KH78-BNT9?type=pdf (explaining how in just over the past 50 years, the 
population on the planet has grown from 2.5 billion to over 6.5 billion and that it is expected to 
reach 9.2 billion people by 2050); Miller, supra note 1, at 218; Diego J. Rodriguez et al., Investing 
in Water Infrastructure: Capital, Operation and Maintenance, WATER PAPERS 11 (Nov. 2012), 
available at http://water.worldbank.org/sites/water.worldbank.org/files/publication/water-investing-
water-infrastructure-capital-operations-maintenance.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5YFT-AHV2 
(depicting the increased investment in water projects in developing countries starting in 1990). 
 8 Miller, supra note 1, at 217. 
 9 E.g., Water Projects & Programs, WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/water/
projects (last visited Feb. 11, 2015), archived at perma.cc/8PPK-9BWF (providing examples of 
water projects and programs from the World Bank). 
 10  E.g., All Projects, WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/water/projects/all 
(last visited Feb. 11, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/8PPK-9BWF. 
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Coverage and accessibility, even at the most elementary level, necessitate 
functional water services and sanitation facilities.11 
The inability of public authorities to provide coverage to their citizens 
prompted a rise in water-services privatization contracts between foreign 
investors and states, such that 10 percent of global consumers now receive 
their water from private companies.12 Today, a growing number of busi-
nesses are engaging with the water services industry.13 It is estimated that 
by 2025, annual spending on water infrastructure in OECD countries will 
exceed $1 trillion.14 New technologies and the need for additional infra-
structure investment will certainly increase demand in the market, potential-
ly spawning billion dollar valuations. Such economic promise and oppor-
tunity largely explains why water has earned the moniker of Earth’s “blue 
gold.” 
No international regime or regulatory body responsible for sanitation 
and water services exists. The growing execution of international invest-
ment treaties in the water sector, however, has resulted in the slow emer-
gence of an international economic form of governance for cross-border 
sanitation and water services. This Article explores the increased role of 
investment treaties in the context of disputes and investment arbitration and 
provides the first exhaustive analysis of this burgeoning water regime.  
Part I of this Article provides an introduction to the cross-border sani-
tation and water-services regime. Part II analyzes the typology of water ser-
vices in international water disputes. Part III outlines a number of multi-
million dollar water investment disputes as held by the World Bank Interna-
tional Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Part IV af-
fords an exhaustive review of the entire case law related to water service 
disputes and identifies recurring issues and scenarios present in classic 
“blue gold” disputes. Part V examines the three key investment principles 
that currently form the backbone of the emerging international economic 
governance of sanitation and water services. Finally, this Article concludes 
with outstanding issues and foreshadows potential concerns facing the “blue 
gold” regime in the years ahead.  
                                                                                                                           
 11 Jose Esteban Castro & Leo Heller, Introduction to WATER AND SANITATION SERVICES: 
PUBLIC POLICY AND MANAGEMENT 1, 1 (Jose Esteban Castro & Leo Heller eds., 2009). 
 12 Murthy, supra note 6, at 122–23, 125. Ninety percent of the world’s 400 largest cities are 
served by the public sector. Id. at 125; see also Miller, supra note 1, at 219. 
 13 See Miller, supra note 1, at 219. 
 14 Rodriguez et al., supra note 7, at 7–8. For developing countries alone, $103 billion per year 
was estimated to finance water, sanitation, and wastewater treatment. Id. at 8.  
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I. WATER SERVICES AS A FORM OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
In Section A, we provide the current international legal framework for 
foreign direct investment and how its wide variety of national and interna-
tional rules and principles have inadvertently formed an emerging system of 
regulatory governance over the international water services sector. In Section 
B, we provide a definition for the term “investment” as it pertains to interna-
tional investment treaties. In Section C, we discuss the ever-evolving charac-
ter of international investment treaties and how the expansion of cross-border 
investment in the sanitation and water services sector has amounted to a pro-
liferation of “blue gold” disputes. In Section D, we discuss the privatization 
and concession contract related arbitration. In Section E, we delve further into 
the clean water distribution system, while Section F further clarifies the 
wastewater and sewerage services regime.  
A. A Recalibration of Customary International Law to International 
Investment Treaties 
Targeted investment host countries develop a tier one level of interna-
tional investment regulation by promulgating national rules to ensure the 
realization of benefits of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and avoid costs.15 
Due to pressure from competing countries, host states must generally com-
bine economic openness with incentives for investors to attract FDIs. 16 
Such incentives are comparable to “free zones,” in which duty-free imports 
and exports are permitted along with direct subsidies and other financial 
incentives and foreign investment guarantees such as, promises to stabilize 
domestic laws, provide tax relief, allow currency conversion, and the repat-
riation of sale proceeds and profits.17 
On a secondary yet complementary tier, international investment law 
provides rules to ensure access for foreign investment to host country markets 
and to protect investments against risks, particularly political risks.18 It cre-
ates a specific set of investment protection obligations on host countries, in-
cluding protection against expropriation without compensation.19 Internation-
                                                                                                                           
 15 See Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Treatification of International Investment Law, 13 L. & BUS. 
REV. AM. 155, 155 (2007). 
 16 UNCTAD, THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS IN ATTRACTING 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 110 (2009), http://unctad.org/en/
docs/diaeia20095_en.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/662Y-96PZ. 
 17 See Dorsati Madani, A Review of the Role and Impact of Export Processing Zones, WORLD 
BANK 5 (Aug. 1999), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/Madani
EPZ.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/GXD3-LETC.  
 18 See Salacuse, supra note 15, at 163. 
 19  See SANTIAGO MONTT, STATE LIABILITY IN INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION—
GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE BIT GENERATION 83 (2009). 
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al investment law also provides access to financial compensation through 
investor-state arbitration if the host country breaches a protection obliga-
tion.20 
International investment agreements (IIAs) serve as a source of inter-
national investment law.21 IIAs include preferential trade and investment 
agreements (PTIAs) and bilateral investment treaties (BITs), both of which 
provide more comprehensive rules on investment.22 Additionally, IIAs pro-
vide for investor-state dispute settlement.23 IIAs strive to ensure a stable and 
predictable environment for investment through investor protection and ar-
bitration mechanisms in cases of breach.24 This “treatification” shows the 
significant recalibration of international investment law over the last few 
years.25  
B. The Meaning of Investment: When Are Sanitation and Water Services 
Subject to Investment Treaties? 
The most fundamental question in determining whether investment 
treaties are applicable to water services is whether a given sanitation or wa-
ter service constitutes a “foreign investment” under international law. In-
deed, this definition constantly changes as entrepreneurs, financiers and 
multinational companies develop innovative investment tools. IIAs tend to 
adopt a broad definition of “investment” that refers to “every kind of asset” 
of a foreign investor in a host country, suggesting the agreement covers any-
thing of economic value.26 Recent interpretations by the ICSID have deter-
mined that “investment” has an intrinsic meaning of contribution.27 If it cre-
ates or generates “fruits and value,” it deserves protection as an “invest-
ment.”28 In many IIAs, the oft-used asset-based definition typically includes 
                                                                                                                           
 20 See id. at 125–26. 
 21  See Anne van Aaken, International Investment Law Between Commitment and Flexibility: 
A Contract Theory Analysis, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 507, 510–11 (2009). 
 22 Id. at 511–14; see UNCTAD, Intellectual Property Provisions in International Investment 
Arrangements (2007), http://unctad.org/en/docs/webiteiia20071_en.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
KZ8M-ZD65. 
 23 See Aaken, supra note 21, at 513. 
 24 See MONTT, supra note 19, at 1; Aaken, supra note 21, at 513–14. 
 25 See Salacuse, supra note 15, at 155. 
 26 See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Argentina for the Promotion and Protec-
tion of Investments, U.K.-Arg., art. 1, Dec. 11, 1990, 1765 U.N.T.S. 33 [hereinafter U.K.-Arg. 
BIT]; Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania for the Promotion and Protection 
of Investments, U.K.-Tanz., art. 1, Jan. 7, 1994, U.K.T.S. 90 (1996). 
 27 Céline Lévesque, Abaclat and Others v. Argentine Republic: The Definition of Investment, 
27 ICSID REV. 247, 253 (2012). 
 28 Id. 
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an illustrative list of assets covered.29 The categories of investments cov-
ered by most BITs remain substantially identical, namely: (a) movable and 
immovable property and other property rights; (b) interests in the property 
of companies; (c) claims to money and claims to a performance; (d) intel-
lectual property rights; and (e) concession rights conferred by law or con-
tract.30 
Alternatively, some IIAs focus on foreign investment as an “enter-
prise” rather than as a variety of assets. 31 Those following the enterprise-
based definition pay particular attention to the investor’s objectives for es-
tablishing a long-term relationship with the economy of the host country—
for example, the acquisition of a lasting interest in the ownership or man-
agement of an enterprise.32  
Water sanitation is the process of cleaning water to make it safe for 
drinking, bathing, cooking, and other uses. Common methods of treating 
water include flocculation, filtration, absorption, ion-exchange, and disin-
fection.33 Any and all of these methods require an individual in the host 
state to own and operate facilities (physical assets) with adequate technical 
expertise and proper technology to sufficiently purify the water. Therefore, 
“investment,” for purposes of water sanitation and water services in interna-
tional law, typically encompasses both the facilities invested in by foreign-
ers (tangible assets) as well as the research and development used to create 
new technologies (intangible assets). 
                                                                                                                           
 29 See, e.g., U.K.-Arg. BIT, supra note 26. 
 30 See, e.g., U.K.-Arg. BIT, supra note 26. 
 31  See Julien Chaisse & Puneeth Nagaraj, Changing Lanes: Intellectual Property Rights, 
Trade and Investment, 37 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 223, 251 (2014).  
 32 See Omar E. García-Bolívar, G3 Agreement: A Comparison of Its Investment Chapter with 
the Emerging International Law of Foreign Investment, 10 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 779, 785 (2004). 
For instance, the G3, the free trade agreement between Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela, takes an 
enterprise-based approach to define investment. Id. 
The G3’s use of an enterprise-based definition is a positive one. By defining invest-
ment in terms of enterprise, the G3 grants protection to non-incorporated forms of FI 
as well as incorporated forms. The term “enterprise” is more general than the term 
“corporation,” but the former comprises the latter. The drafters of the G3 differenti-
ated between constituting an enterprise and organizing an enterprise. The agreement 
states that an enterprise will be any entity constituted, organized or protected under 
domestic laws. Such a provision opens the door for protection of non-incorporated 
forms of business organizations.  
Id. 
 33 See OFFICE OF WATER, EPA, DRINKING WATER TREATMENT 2 (2004), available at http://water.
epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/sdwa/upload/2009_08_28_sdwa_fs_30ann_treatment_web.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/FVE4-ZKYM. 
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C. The Proliferation of “Blue Gold” Disputes 
Investors have increasingly exercised their arbitration rights under the 
IIAs in recent years. To date, twenty-one claims dealing with foreign in-
vestments in the water industry have been filed internationally. The prolif-
eration of sanitation and water-related disputes before international invest-
ment tribunals serves as an important phenomenon. 
The key feature of investment protection under BITs is that it allows 
foreign investors to challenge host governments’ actions before an interna-
tional arbitral tribunal.34 This is imperative because domestic judicial sys-
tems may be biased against foreign interests. Moreover, national courts may 
be more likely to fall under pressures from other branches of government. 
The ability of foreign investors to bring their disputes to independent arbi-
trators provides assurances to the investors that domestic authorities will 
live up to their international obligations, thus ensuring a favorable and sta-
ble investment climate in the host country.35  
This proliferation of water-services disputes must be further analysed 
by considering the type of services currently provided by foreign investors 
and the details of the claims and breaches of treaties, which often result in 
heavy compensation for the winning party. 
D. Privatization and Concession Contract Related Arbitration 
Privatization refers to a variety of partnerships between host states and 
private, foreign or local, investors or companies with different degrees of 
ownership in management and operating services. 36  These partnerships 
have given the entire water sector management a brand new framework of 
policies.  
Privatization is attractive as a means of improving, developing, and 
expanding the water service infrastructure by increasing its efficiency, dis-
tribution and technical expertise.37 From 1990 to 1997, more than ninety 
projects in thirty-five different countries concerning water services had been 
undertaken by the private sector.38  
Privatization of public services can be formalized in various agreement 
configurations. A common and recurring practice can be clearly identified 
upon examination of the twenty-one water services disputes discussed later 
                                                                                                                           
 34 See Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L. J. 67, 88 (2005). 
 35 See id. 
 36 See Miller, supra note 1, at 228. 
 37 See id.; George Mergos, Private Participation in the Water Sector: Recent Trends and 
Issues, EUROPEAN WATER, Jan.-June 2005, at 59, 63. 
 38 Mergos, supra note 37, at 65. 
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in this Article. Indeed, in nearly every case, the same form of privatization 
and foreign investment was disputed: the concession agreement. 
The most important foreign investments of the past twenty years were 
formalized with this special kind of privatization contract called a conces-
sion.39 In ninety-seven contracts with foreign investors, forty-eight of them 
were concessions, which accounts for almost 80 percent of total private in-
vestment in developing countries.40 Concession contracts are popular with 
governments for several reasons. The different types of concession con-
tracts allow governments to allocate risks and responsibility according to 
their needs.41 For instance, in a concession contract, all associated risks, 
financial and commercial, are transferred to the investor.42 Traditionally, a 
full concession agreement transfers the full operational and management 
responsibility of the entire water supply and sewerage system to the private 
contractor.43 In other cases, a partial concession agreement option can stand, 
which defines the conditions and obligations transferred to the private con-
tractor.44 In these kinds of concessions, usually the assets remain controlled 
by the government through monitoring and regulations and the water ser-
vices are still public property. 45 The private company, however, has the 
complete responsibility for operation systems, maintenance and new in-
vestments, without actually owning the assets.46 At the end of the contract, 
the assets are returned in good condition to the public authorities who had 
always retained title to the infrastructure.47 All of these subtleties are active-
ly negotiated between the two parties and differ on a case-by-case basis. 
In any event, under a concession contract, the private company is gen-
erally responsible for everything including: the setting of customer and tar-
iff rates, labor, expanding infrastructure, and new technologies. 48  These 
contracts are commonly made with a long duration, often over twenty-five 
years, to allow for more continuity and sustainability.49 The specific condi-
tions of the contract depend on the long-term and short-term goals of each 
party, such as the capacity of the government, how much private investors 
want to invest, and how much infrastructure construction is required.50 
                                                                                                                           
 39 See Mergos, supra note 37, at 67. 
 40 See id. 
 41 See id.  
 42 See Miller, supra note 1, at 217, 230. 
 43 See id. 
 44 See id. 
 45 See id. 
 46 See id. 
 47 See id. 
 48 See id. 
 49 Judith A. Rees, Regulation and Private Participation in the Water and Sanitation Sector, 
22 NAT. RES. F. 95, 99 (1998). 
 50 See id. at 99–100; Miller, supra note 1, at 230.  
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Furthermore, the contract can be well negotiated and regulated legally, 
constitutionally, and politically even before its application. If negotiated 
effectively, such contracts can ensure that water prices do not reach outra-
geous levels. Authorities can also reduce public outcry by arguing that they 
are actually not selling public assets nor placing them in the hands of for-
eign investors. It also reduces the regulatory burden on the government by 
using the concession contract itself as the regulatory mechanism. 
Although every concession contracts is unique, there is a classic pat-
tern in the formation of such contracts.51 The process begins with the launch 
of a public bid tender in order to find the best company to manage the water 
system.52 Bidders compete to provide the best services at the lowest price, 
including the largest discounts to the public tariff among other considera-
tions.53 Generally, bids are awarded to companies with strong financial and 
technological capabilities.54 The winner of the bid tender, called the conces-
sionaire, will then be responsible for operating and maintaining the fixed 
assets, expanding coverage, and guaranteeing the water quality and devel-
oping the sewage system. Afterwards, negotiations begin, where the gov-
ernment describes what it expects from the investment such as goals, ex-
pansion plans, new technologies, coverage, overall efficiency, price and 
duration. The concessionaire identifies its investment priorities and re-
sponds to the government’s requests by detailing the investor’s methodolo-
gy, costs, and expected duration. The government is usually responsible for 
paying a compensable monthly fee, set by a mathematical formula, to the 
concessionaire. The government is also responsible for setting the proce-
dure of the collection of the bills from the customers. In addition, the gov-
ernment must assume the role of the regulator in the concession agree-
ment.55 In order to ensure that the customer is protected during the privati-
zation process, different regulatory tasks must be observed by the state.56 
The regulatory tasks include, but are not limited to, control over unfair trad-
ing practice, safety net regulations, promoting water use efficiency, ensur-
ing responsiveness to final customer needs.57 In return, the concessionaire is 
responsible for providing services and guarantees of performance while 
                                                                                                                           
 51 Kevin Sansom & Richard Franceys, CONTRACTING OUT WATER AND SANITATION SER-
VICES: CASE STUDIES AND ANALYSIS OF SERVICE AND MANAGEMENT CONTRACTS IN DEVELOP-
ING COUNTRIES 5–6 (Sansom et al. eds. 2003). 
 52 See Claude Crampes & Antonio Estache, Regulating Water Concession: Lessons from the 
Buenos Aires Concession, WORLD BANK GROUP, Sept. 1996, at 2. 
 53 See id. 
 54 See id. 
 55 See id. at 2–3. 
 56 See Rees, supra note 49, at 100. 
 57 See id. 
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meeting the standards set out in the concession contract.58 Generally, water 
and tariff prices are the first and most important points fixed in the agree-
ment as these costs often involve several million of dollars. 
The parties agree to not only a fixed general price at the outset of the 
concession, but also its maximum percentage augmentation for subsequent 
years. This enables the parties to identify their interests early on in the pro-
cess. The investor knows that it will be possible to make some profits and 
returns on investment in the following years, and the government is certain 
that only a maximum augmentation will be possible, maintaining an effi-
cient access to water to its citizens. In this way, the concession is the key to 
expanding access to water and services rehabilitation, while minimizing the 
impact on tariffs. As it is impossible to predict the economic, environmen-
tal, social or even technological changes for such a long period of time, the 
tariff formula must be reviewed and renegotiated from time to time.59 An-
nual adjustments can be made, for example, to accommodate for an increase 
or decrease of water consumption or wastewater treated, but every change 
must maintain the profit percentage initially fixed in favor of the investor.60 
This delicate point is often a key factor in the water investment arbitration 
cases.61 
E. Clean Water Distribution Systems 
 Pure water, directly from rivers or oceans is rarely clean enough for 
direct human consumption. Therefore, water purification systems must be 
used to remove all possible bacteria and contaminants before it reaches con-
sumers. This process commonly involves physical and chemical methods 
such as clarification and disinfection.62 
Water quality refers to the biological, radiological, chemical and phys-
ical characteristics of the water.63 In order to reach sufficient quality, every 
water supply system must follow and reach certain national standards de-
pending on the intended use of the water whether it be for industrial, agri-
cultural, cleaning, or drinking use.64 Certain considerations such as turbidi-
ty, color, taste, hardness, odor, and corrosiveness are considered when ana-
                                                                                                                           
 58  See Jennifer Baumert & Laura Bloodgood, Private Sector Participation in the Water and 
Wastewater Services Industry 22–23 (U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n Working Paper ID-08, 2004), available 
at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/15876/1/id040008.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/XJ5U-FCC6
?type=pdf. 
 59 Rees, supra note 49, at 100. 
 60 See Crampes & Estache, supra note 52, at 3. 
 61 See id. 
 62 See WORLD HEALTH ORG., GUIDELINES FOR DRINKING-WATER QUALITY 4–7 (4th ed. 
2011). 
 63 See id. 
 64 Id. at 2.  
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lyzing water quality in order to avoid serious human health concerns result-
ing from procedural oversight.65 
Access to water requires both a readily available water supply and a 
well-constructed distribution system.66 Water distribution systems consist of 
a series of interconnected storage tanks, valves, pumps, hydrants and pipes 
that transport and provide water to consumers, both individuals and indus-
tries.67 In other words, a water distribution system is the mechanism that 
carries water from the source to the consumer and is ultimately responsible 
for providing an uninterrupted supply of well-pressurized and safe drinking 
water.68 
High quality distribution systems are critical components in delivering 
safe drinking water in developing countries where too many people still 
receive poor water distribution services.69 Water supply quality has three 
chief dimensions. First, it is necessary to have a certain continuity of supply 
and afford a sufficient quantity of water.70 Second, the water must be pro-
vided with adequate pressure, sufficient for operating plumbing fixtures and 
firefighting equipment but at the same time not so high as to cause leaks or 
pipeline breaks that could result in waste of water.71 It also allows the cus-
tomer to have a sufficient amount of drinkable water available on a normal 
flow.72 Third, and most important, high quality service must provide high 
quality, safe drinking water where needed.73 
F. Wastewater and Sewerage Services 
Yet another category of water related cases concerns wastewater and 
sewerage services. Sewage services are the second phase in managing water 
resources. Once the water is used, either for domestic or industrial purposes, 
it is necessary to collect the wastewater and remove its impurities before it 
reaches its final destination for settlement or reuse. 74 Sewerage services 
consist of a network of pipes and pumps for the collection of wastewater.75 
                                                                                                                           
 65 See id. at 6, 7, 28, 174, 225. 
 66 See HARRY E. HICKEY, WATER SUPPLY SYSTEMS AND EVALUATION METHODS 2 (U.S. 
Fire Admin., Oct. 2008).  
 67 See id. at 1–4. 
 68 See id. at 5. 
 69 See WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE RIGHT TO WATER 6, 15 (2003). 
 70 See HICKEY, supra note 66, at 1–4. 
 71 See id. 
 72 See id. 
 73 See id. 
 74 See Sewage Treatment, FOUNDATION FOR WATER RESEARCH, http://www.euwfd.com/html/
sewage_treatment.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/8Z6A-KCGK. 
 75 Wastewater Disposal and Transport Options—Sewerage, WORLD BANK GROUP, http://
water.worldbank.org/shw-resource-guide/infrastructure/menu-technical-options/sewerage (last visit-
ed Feb. 14, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/5HM6-W399. 
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Sewerage is a complex and technical procedure. An understanding of three 
fundamental characteristics of sewerage services is essential to mastering 
wastewater service goals. 
The first fundamental characteristic is the collection and disposal of 
wastewater. It consists of a system of pipes, which transports the 
wastewater for treatment and ultimately for disposal. 76  There are many 
types of wastewater collection systems. Maintenance of these systems is an 
integral component of the proper management of sewerage services and is 
critical for preventing illegal wastewater releases.77 Moreover, disposal of 
the treated wastewater is a delicate procedure and difficult to achieve. The 
final destination of treated sewage water is largely earth’s soil, oceans, and 
rivers.78 Thus, many environmental and technical precautions must be made 
when discharging the treated water out of sewage systems including anaer-
obic digestion (bacterial process), composting, or sometimes, incineration.79 
The second characteristic is disease potential. The sewage process is 
critical because it stops water-borne diseases such as cholera and typhoid. 
However, during the collection method, small amounts of chemicals or or-
ganic compounds from cleaning and disinfection operations are often dis-
charged into sewers and into the air.80 Sewage may also contain assorted 
chemicals and specialized disposables such as medical waste, microbiologi-
cal pathogens, nitrates and oils. Therefore, without proper treatment, there 
is a significant risk of water-borne diseases such as infections, intestinal and 
lung problems, and fever that pose a danger to the public.81 
The third characteristic of wastewater services is sewage treatment. In 
order to protect public health, sewage water must be purified to remove or-
ganics, destroy bacteria, and neutralize toxic and chemicals waste.82 There 
are varying methods and processes to treat the wastewater, depending on the 
degree of contamination, local conditions, governmental regulations, and 
general industry standards.83  
                                                                                                                           
 76 See Sewage Treatment, supra note 74. 
 77 Wastewater Collection System Toolbox, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/region1/sso/toolbox.html 
(last visited Feb. 14, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/2Y5Q-UNHW. 
 78 See Final Disposal of Wastewater, WORLD BANK GROUP, http://water.worldbank.org/shw-
resource-guide/infrastructure/menu-technical-options/final-disposal (last visited Feb. 14, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/P36S-4MBH. 
 79 See Sewage Treatment, supra note 74. 
 80 WORLD HEALTH ORG., COLLECTION AND DISPOSAL OF WASTEWATER, http://www.who.int/
water_sanitation_health/medicalwaste/130to134.pdf 130 (last visited Feb. 14, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/DQ2B-H8XN. 
 81 Id. 
 82 See Introduction to Wastewater Treatment Processes, WORLD BANK GROUP, http://water.
worldbank.org/shw-resource-guide/infrastructure/menu-technical-options/wastewater-treatment (last 
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Although the wastewater treatment process is very technical, it can be 
summarized as follows. The primary treatment consists of physical operations 
to remove floating solids and sedimentation by gravity.84 This removes ap-
proximately 60 percent of impurities.85 The wastewater is passed through a 
screen to trap solid objects and sedimentation.86 The rest of the liquid is then 
subject to the secondary treatment, which consists of a biological process that 
removes organic matter and approximately 85 percent of impurities.87 After 
the biological methods, tertiary treatments are conducted to eliminate every 
other constituent left after the first and second treatment stages, removing 
approximately 99 percent of impurities.88 The aim of the tertiary treatment is 
to significantly improve the quality of wastewater before discharging it into 
the environment and is often the most expensive stage for water companies.89 
Finally, the wastewater undergoes disinfection before it is discharged.90 Chlo-
rine is typically used to remove and destroy any remaining pathogens.91 At 
this point, wastewater is ready for public use.  
II. TYPOLOGY OF WATER SERVICES IN INTERNATIONAL  
INVESTMENT DISPUTES 
Countries have begun to increasingly rely on private sector participa-
tion in the water supply sector and the provision of sanitation services. This 
is due to budget pressures, a drive for greater efficiency in service delivery, 
and because of the promotion by agency donors for greater private sector 
participation. A range of options for private sector participation in water 
supply and sanitation exists, ranging from service contracts for functions 
such as billing and collection to concessions for complete operations to 
maintenance and network expansion.92  
Investing in water services can be a very delicate, laborious and un-
steady task. While the definition of investment involves some risks, water 
services appear to be a singular type of investment. Indeed, it simultaneous-
ly involves technological means and knowledge, financial funding, and a 
panoply of laws including investment law, international law, human rights 
                                                                                                                           
 84 See Introduction to Wastewater Treatment Processes, supra note 82. 
 85 See id. 
 86 See id. 
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standards, contractual rights and obligations, national laws, and more. 93 
This may be one of the reasons why water investment disputes have surged 
in recent years.94 
Between 2006 and 2014, at least twenty-one water services related 
cases were brought to international arbitration. This number, however, may 
only be the tip of the iceberg because many arbitration cases have yet to be 
released to the public or continue to remain in private negotiation. Before 
further discussion, it is imperative that we review the typology of the “blue 
gold” investments and briefly define the types of water services detailed in 
the twenty-one arbitration disputes to date. A brief look at the diversity of 
services mentioned will provide a more holistic perspective and a better 
understanding of the current state of water services as well as the delicate 
stakes present in these water disputes. 
A. Water Utilities Construction Projects 
A survey of major international water cases has uncovered four general 
categories of water-services disputes. The first category consists of water 
utilities constructions projects. This type of service has resulted in four ma-
jor disputes. 
In ATA Construction, Indus. and Trading Co. v. Jordan (2010), a Turk-
ish company, ATA, was hired by a local, Jordanian state owned company, 
APC, which operated the water services for the construction of a dike at a 
site in the Dead Sea.95 The construction contract was signed on May 2, 
1998 and was governed by the laws of Jordan per the Turkey-Jordan BIT of 
1993.96 During the filling process by the local company, a section of the 
dike collapsed.97 Originally, the dispute began in front of local courts but 
ultimately ended up in front of the ICSID arbitral tribunal, where investors 
alleged several denials of justice by the Jordanian courts in breach of their 
BIT.98 
 In LESI S.p.A. v. Algeria (2008), an Italian company was hired by Al-
geria for the construction of a dam.99 The dam was meant to supply drinka-
                                                                                                                           
 93 See generally Rebecca Bates, The Trade in Water Services: How Does GATS Apply to the 
Water and Sanitation Service Sector, 31 SYDNEY L. REV. 121 (2009) (exploring the stakes and 
impact of general investment agreement on water and sanitation services sector). 
 94 See Jorge E. Vinuales, Access to Water in Foreign Investment Disputes, 21 GEO. INT’L 
ENVTL. L. REV. 733, 733 (2009). 
 95 ATA Constr., Indus. and Trading Co. v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/08/2, Award, ¶¶ 30–31 (May 18, 2010). 
 96 Id. ¶¶ 31, 37. 
 97 Id. ¶ 32. 
 98 Id. ¶¶ 35–37. 
 99 LESI S.p.A. and ASTALDI S.p.A. v. People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/05/3, Award, ¶¶ 3–4, 7 (Nov. 12, 2008).  
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ble water to the city of Algiers.100 On December 20, 1993, LESI was award-
ed the bid for approximately a five-month deadline and a fixed global mar-
ket price in local currency.101 The Algeria-Italy BIT was signed in 1991.102 
Algeria eventually terminated the construction contract after difficulties in 
executing the project in light of the unstable security situation.103 The inves-
tor subsequently alleged a breach of the BIT as a result of Algeria’s ac-
tions.104 
 In Salini Costruttori, S.p.A. v. Jordan (2006), an Italian company was 
awarded a contract in 1993 for the construction of a dam in Jordan, entitled 
the “Karameh Dam Project.”105 The 1996 Italy-Jordan BIT governed the 
contract.106 The dispute arose due to disagreement on the payment amount 
to the contractor.107 Investors brought the suit before an arbitral tribunal for 
an alleged breach of the BIT by the state.108 
In another, lesser known, Jordanian case, JacobsGibb, Ltd. v. Jordan 
(2004), an English company was hired to construct a waterway in Jordan. The 
project was governed by the 1979 Jordan-United Kingdom BIT.109 Unfortu-
nately, further information regarding this case has not been released to the 
public. 
B. Clean Water Distribution and Sewage Services Facilities 
 The second category of water services often involved in arbitration 
involves clean water distribution and sewage services facilities.110 These 
disputes have been far more significant. This category includes a wide vari-
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ety of services and amounts to 85 percent of water disputes. This type of 
service has resulted in six international disputes.111  
 In Azurix Corp. v. Argentina (2006), an American corporation won the 
tender for a thirty-year concession to provide drinkable water (distribution, 
supply, utilities and treatment) in conjunction with wastewater utilities (col-
lection and disposal).112 The contract was signed in 1999 and included var-
ied water infrastructure repairs in a Buenos Aires province.113 The tariff re-
gime and diverse infrastructure repairs were also initially fixed in the 
agreement.114 At that time, the foreign investor, Azurix, paid 438.5 million 
pesos (local currency) for the concession.115 The Argentina-United States 
BIT was signed in 1991.116 Also noteworthy is that this case took place 
when Argentina was suffering from a serious and devastating economic cri-
sis.117 
 In Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentina (2007), a 
French-based company and a local company entered into a thirty-year con-
cession agreement in 1995 to operate the clean water supply and sewage 
services in the province of Tucuman.118 The concession consisted of provid-
ing drinkable water and improving overall quality of service by refurbishing 
the chlorination system, purchasing new equipment, and improving the 
clean water treatment bulk. 119  The Argentina-France BIT was signed in 
1991.120 As in Azurix, the concession was part of the broader privatization 
campaign of the state owned water services during Argentina’s economic 
and financial crisis.121 
                                                                                                                           
 111 See, e.g., AWG Group, UNCITRAL Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability; Suez 
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 117 Id. ¶ 57. 
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One more prominent dispute regarding clean water supply services in-
volved the AWG Group v. Argentina case joint with Suez Societad General 
de Aguas de Barcelona and Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic 
(2010).122 In 1992, Argentina granted a thirty-year concession with French, 
Spanish and English investors to operate the water distribution and 
wastewater services for the city of Buenos Aires and the surrounding mu-
nicipalities.123 Suez, Vivendi and AWG formed a consortium and won the 
public bid.124 The consortium was viewed as the most economically effi-
cient solution for providing high quality water services to the city and sur-
rounding areas.125 Soon after, Aguas Argentina, a local company, formed to 
handle and operate the concession made between the state and the inves-
tors.126 At the same time, they were designated as the general operator and 
signed a management contract aside from the concession contract.127 The 
services to be provided through the concession included a continuous sup-
ply of drinkable and quality water and major investments to improve the 
overall system.128 The initial capitalization of the concession amounted to 
$120 million. 129  The different BITs between France, Spain and United 
Kingdom and Argentina were signed between 1990 and 1992.130 This dis-
pute also took place during the financial crisis in Argentina.131 
In Suez Societad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v. Argentine Re-
public (2010), Argentina granted a thirty-year concession to operate a speci-
fied water supply, distribution service and wastewater service to the prov-
ince of Santa Fe to a local company (Aguas Provinciales de Santa Fe S.A.) 
managed and created by a foreign and French based investor (Suez).132 The 
concession aimed to improve and expand the water distribution system and 
sewage services among other goals.133 As with nearly every other water dis-
                                                                                                                           
 122 See generally AWG Group Ltd. v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL Case No. ARB/03/19, 
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pute from Argentina, the concession contract took place in a national privat-
ization movement and during a serious and disastrous financial crisis.134 
Similar services were involved in Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Bolivia 
(2006), where Bolivia awarded a forty-year concession to a local company 
managed by a Dutch company for the exclusive provision of potable water 
and sewages services in the city of Cochabama.135 The main goals of the 
concession agreement were to provide a regular volume and certain quality 
of drinkable water in exchange of return on the consequent investment.136 
The Bolivia-Netherlands BIT was signed in 1992.137 
In Gelsenwasser AG v. Algeria (2012), the foreign, German based, in-
vestor was awarded a five and a half-year concession management contract, 
to improve the water and sewage services in the city of Anaba.138 Algeria 
terminated the contract three years early.139   
Finally, in a more recent case, Dutch investors bought controlling 
rights in a utilities company that provides water services for the city of Tal-
lin in Estonia and its surrounding areas.140 The investors subsequently gave 
a notice of arbitration against the state in May 2014.141 This case evidences 
the still increasing and immediate issues regarding water services and for-
eign investment at the present time.142 In this case, the water services, in-
cluding safe water distribution and sewage services, aimed to achieve the 
quality service standards required by national and European regulations 
within a fifteen-year license period.143 The Estonia-Netherlands BIT was 
signed in 1992.144 
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C. Wastewater and Sewerage Services 
The third category of water services often involved a number of lead-
ing foreign investment water related cases involving delicate and highly 
technical wastewater and sewerage services.145 
In Impregilo v. Argentine Republic (2011), a consortium of internation-
al companies was awarded a thirty-year concession to manage and operate 
the wastewater sewerage services—collection, treatment, disposal, potential 
reuse of sewage, maintenance and more—in a province of Buenos Aires 
that covered seven municipalities.146 The contract included overall system 
improvements, such as maintenance, an expansion project design, and con-
struction and rehabilitation.147 The foreign investor made an initial payment 
of $1.26 million along with the foundation of a local company to operate 
the services.148 A five-year plan was presented explaining and adjusting the 
updates and improvements needed to fulfill the agreement’s aims.149 In ad-
dition, the investor took part in a national “service expansion and optimiza-
tion program” (POES).150 The Argentina-Italy BIT was signed in 1990.151 
As with every Argentinian dispute, it took place during troubled times and 
national financial crisis.152 
In another wastewater services investment case, SAUR International v. 
Argentine Republic (2014), a French based foreign investor was awarded a 
concession to provide water and sewerage services.153 SAUR constituted a 
local company to operate the concession and conjointly concluded a tech-
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nical assistance contract.154 The previous local company operating the water 
services signed another concession contract with the new local company 
and a management contract with the investor.155 SAUR invested more than 
$72.4 million to hold participating shares in the company.156 These contrac-
tual processes once again took place during the Argentinian crisis.157 
In Urbaser S.A. v. Argentine Republic (2012), once again, the opera-
tion of sewage services covering seven districts in the province of Buenos 
Aires were involved in a concession granted to a Spanish based investor.158 
The investor acquired an interest of 47.4 percent of the local and operating 
company.159 The Argentina-Spain BIT was signed in 1991.160 
In a similar case, Aguas Cordobesas S.A. v. Argentine Republic (2007), 
the wastewater services were involved in a thirty-year concession contract 
following a public tender to provide potable water and sewages services in 
Argentina.161 The Argentina-Spain and the Argentina-France BIT were both 
signed in 1991.162 Unfortunately, however, the case remains unreleased to 
the public. 
In another leading case, Biwater Gauff Ltd. v. Tanzania (2008), there 
was a dispute involving a ten-year concession contract with German and 
English based investors to manage, operate, and improve the water and 
sewerage services in Dar El Saalam, Tanzania.163 The concession was part 
of a national investment program supported by the World Bank, the African 
Development Bank and the European Investment Bank.164 Under the terms 
of the bid, the investors signed three different contracts with a local compa-
ny to incorporate it with the City-Water project.165 The United Kingdom-
Tanzania BIT was signed in 1994.166 
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Finally, in Azurix Corp v. Argentine Republic (2012), a foreign compa-
ny was awarded a water and sewerage services concession agreement in 
Argentina.167 The Argentina-United Kingdom BIT was signed in 1990.168  
D. Diverse Water Related Services 
The few other cases known to date fall within a fourth category of di-
verse water related services.169 
Bayview Irrigation District et al. v. United Mexican States (2007), in-
volved questions about alleged water rights to seize water from part of the 
Rio Grande, as well as distribution and irrigation services.170 The NAFTA 
agreement was signed in 1994.171  
In another case, Nepolsky v. Czech Republic (2010), the dispute con-
cerned a water extraction and project between Czech Republic and a Ger-
man based investor and contractor.172 The Czech Republic-Germany BIT 
was signed in 1990.173  
Furthermore, in Branimir Mensik v. Slovak Republic (2008), the dis-
pute concerned a mineral water spring project between the Slovak Republic 
and a Swiss based investor and contractor.174  
Finally, in Sun Belt Water v. Canada, the dispute would have encom-
passed water management and bulk water exports.175 Sun Belt, an American 
based investor, invested in Canada in the new industry to export surplus 
water by marine transport systems.176 The investment was aimed at addi-
tional supplies of fresh water in South Carolina, Nevada, Arizona, and Mex-
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ico and included diverse infrastructure meant to deliver water via tankers as 
well as the acquisition of licenses to export the water surplus by maritime 
transport.177 
In sum, after reviewing the diverse typology of water services involved 
in the twenty-one aforementioned cases, it appears that the water privatiza-
tion business has already covered many areas in the water market. Water 
distribution and sewage services remain the most lucrative aspects of the 
water service sector. With this in mind, we now turn to the outcomes of 
each dispute. 
III. MAPPING THE “BLUE GOLD” DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS  
At least three main categories of outcomes are immediately evident 
upon examination of the twenty-one aforementioned water dispute cases. A 
concise map of these water dispute outcomes is necessary to illustrate a 
clearer perspective of this new breed of arbitration. 
A. Wrongful Acts of the State 
The most significant category of outcomes are in favor of the investor. 
Indeed, the majority of these water disputes ended in the same way, award-
ing outstanding compensation amounts to the foreign investor for an as-
sortment of BIT breaches and wrongful actions by the state. 
1. The Six Disputes That Resulted in Awards Against the State 
To begin, the water dispute in ATA Construction, Indus. and Trading 
Co. v. Jordan (2010) resulted in favor of the Turkish investor. 178 After seri-
ous disagreements on the liability for the dike collapse in front of the Jorda-
nian courts, the Court of Appeal decided in 2006 to annul ATA’s first arbi-
tration award in favor of the investor under the Jordanian Arbitration Law. 
Jordan’s Court of Cassation confirmed the decision in 2007. In the same 
course, the court extinguished the right to arbitrate the dispute contained in 
the initial contract. In 2010, the Turkish investor brought the case to ICSID 
arbitration.179 The arbitral tribunal upheld ATA’s claim against Jordan and 
found that the retroactive extinguishment of the arbitration agreement by 
Jordanian courts after the dike collapse litigation constituted a clear breach 
of the BIT, confirming ATA’s basic contractual right as well as its violation 
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by Jordan. 180 The state action resulted in an “unlawful expropriation” of 
ATA’s investment and a violation of both “the letter and the spirit of the 
Turkey-Jordan BIT”.181 The state was ordered to immediately cease these 
interferences with the investor’s right and awarded its restitution.182 
In Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic (2006), once again the investor 
won the case, though only partially.183 The tribunal found that several ac-
tions by Argentina constituted clear breaches of the BIT it had entered into 
with investors.184 Provincial authorities allowed political interests to inter-
fere with the tariff regime applied by the company and initially fixed by the 
concession agreement, thus precluding the company from increasing its 
revenue.185 Moreover, the province’s failure to repair infrastructure resulted 
in an algae outbreak and incessant calls from the provincial governor direct-
ing the public to not pay the company bills.186 The state was therefore found 
liable for breach of the BIT on the basis of a lack of “fair and equitable 
treatment,” “full protection and security,” and “arbitrary or discriminatory 
measures” towards Azurix’s investment. 187 Ultimately, Argentina had to 
pay a large sum in damages to its investor.188 
In Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentine Republic 
(2007), the award also ended in favor of the investor. 189 Soon after the be-
ginning of the concession, strong oppositions to the privatization agreement 
arose from the new local government.190 Pressures to impose a tariff reduc-
tion, water turbidity episodes leading local authorities to proclaim health 
risks without any proof, and further negotiation failures resulted in the ab-
rupt termination of the contract by the state in 1997.191 Various actions by 
Argentina were found by the arbitral tribunal to be clear breaches of the BIT 
signed by both parties in various ways. 192 First, Argentina violated the “fair 
and equitable treatment” of Vivendi’s investment by acting illegitimately to 
end the concession or forcing its renegotiation.193 The state likewise violat-
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ed the “protection and full security” provision by means of illegitimate na-
tional sovereign acts.194 Moreover, in the tribunal’s view, despite the physi-
cal and managerial control of the concession, the devastating economic ef-
fect on its viability was equal to an indirect “expropriation without compen-
sation” and therefore also constituted a breach of the BIT.195 Losing the dis-
pute, the liable state was finally ordered to compensate the investor.196 
Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic (2011) also stands as another 
significant case awarded in favor of the investor. 197 Achievement of the 
concession’s aims and the POES program were perceived as in danger after 
experiencing difficulties in collecting bills from customers.198 In 2002, Ar-
gentina’s authorities enacted a law freezing all utility contracts.199 In addi-
tion, the investor’s right to stop water supply for non-payment was sus-
pended.200 In these troubled times, the state argued that it was in fact the 
company who was breaching its obligations under the concession agree-
ment and put a definitive end to it.201 Argentina then transferred the water 
services to a local state owned supplier.202 The arbitral tribunal found that 
Argentina violated the fair and equitable treatment of Impreglio’s invest-
ment by failing to restore a reasonable equilibrium to the concession.203 The 
tribunal also found that Argentina breached the “arbitrary and discriminato-
ry measures” obligations of the BIT.204 These violations led to the award of 
costly damages in favor of the investor.205 
In yet another Argentinian case, SAUR International v. Argentine Re-
public (2014), the tribunal awarded in favor of the investor. After severe 
financial difficulties suffered by the local company followed by collapse 
risks of the overall sewage system, diverse emergency measures were taken 
by the state, which proved highly detrimental to the investor. After two 
failed negotiations and agreements between the parties, local authorities 
terminated the concession contract, as well as the technical assistance con-
tract attached to the concession, and transferred it to a local and state owned 
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company.206 In the tribunal’s view, Argentina breached the “fair and equita-
ble treatment” as well as the expropriation without compensation provisions 
of the BIT.207 This subsequently led to a high final compensation in favor of 
the foreign investor.208 
Finally, in the case of Biwater Gauff Ltd. v. Tanzania (2008), the con-
cession presented some serious financial difficulties and was even in danger 
of shutting down.209 The major overestimation of projected tariff revenue at 
the bidding stage and the poor condition of the overall system that led to 
numerous unexpected challenges were only some of the reasons why the 
concession was in jeopardy.210 After a failed salvation agreement attempt 
between both parties, the state took drastic and damaging measures, includ-
ing the usurpation of management control, deportation of the company 
manager, takeover of the water facilities and business, and finally, in 2005, 
the abrupt termination and repudiation of the concession contract.211 The 
assets were later reposed by the previous state owned water supplier.212 In 
this case, the tribunal found that Tanzania’s actions amounted to an unlaw-
ful expropriation even if the termination of the concession was inevitable.213 
The tribunal also found that some of Tanzania’s actions were unnecessary 
and abusive and therefore amounted to violations of both its obligation to 
ensure “full protection and security” and provide “fair and equitable treat-
ment” to its English investors.214 Additionally, the state was found liable for 
“unreasonable and discriminatory conduct.”215 In this case, however, even if 
Tanzania was liable, these acts did not cause quantifiable financial or com-
mercial losses and therefore, no financial compensation was awarded.216 
2. The Cost of Non-Compliance: Compensation Awarded in Water Disputes 
When host states are found liable for BIT breaches against a foreign 
investor, they have to pay the price. In most of these water disputes won by 
the investor, the compensation amounts are tremendous.217 Such economic 
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consequences are not soon forgotten. From 2006 to 2014, six leading water 
services disputes were decided in favor of the investor.218 In total, approxi-
mately $300 million in compensation was awarded to investors. 219 This, 
without adding the interest amounts which generally hovered at a rate of six 
percent.220 
Azurix probably represents the most expensive loss and highest com-
pensation amount due in a water services dispute to date. Argentina was 
found liable for three serious BIT breaches and ordered by the arbitral tri-
bunal to pay over $165 million in compensation to the American investor; 
an amount calculated on account of the fair market value of the conces-
sion.221 A semi-annually compounded interest at a rate of 2.44 percent was 
added to this amount. 222  In addition to that, Argentina had to pay 
$34,496.00 in costs and tribunal fees. Each party was responsible for their 
own costs and attorney fees.223 
In the second most expensive water case, Vivendi, Argentina was found 
liable for three BIT breaches and ordered to pay a $105 million in compen-
sation for damages to investors.224 To this amount, an annually compounded 
interest was added at a rate of six percent. Moreover, the host state had to 
pay over $700,000 for legal and other costs, plus interest at a rate of six 
percent starting from the award date until the final payment.225 The fees and 
expenses, however, were equally divided between both parties.226 
The SAUR case is a further example of the bitter taste of states’ non-
compliance cost. In this dispute, Argentina was liable for two main BIT 
breaches, was ordered to pay over $39 million in damages, plus interest at 
an annual rate of six percent.227 In addition, Argentina had to pay over $2 
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million in arbitral costs and attorney fees, with interest at an annual rate of 
six percent.228  
In Impregilo, Argentina was found liable for BIT breaches.229 The tri-
bunal awarded over $21 million in compensation, plus an annually com-
pounded interest at a rate of six percent starting from July 2006 until the 
final payment to the Italian investor.230 The fees and expenses, however, 
were equally divided between both parties.231 
The award in Biwater is probably one of the most unique. Here, the 
tribunal found the host state liable for four different BIT breaches, which is 
more than in similarly situated water disputed cases.232 The tribunal, how-
ever, awarded no compensation.233 According to the tribunal, the investors 
were unable to prove any quantifiable or commercial loss nor any causal 
link between the violations and the economic diminution of its invest-
ment.234 Therefore, every claim for damages was dismissed and the investor 
was not entitled to compensation.235 Arbitration costs were equally divided 
and each party had to pay its own expenses and attorneys fees.236 Despite 
the outcome, this case remains consequential; the result of its final award is 
still extremely relevant in terms of legal implications in water-services in-
vestment law and should continue to be carefully considered. 
Finally, the ATA case represents the lowest compensation awarded in 
favor of the investor until now, apart from Biwater. The arbitral tribunal 
ordered a termination of Jordanian court proceedings on the subject, and 
found that the claimant was “entitled to proceed with litigation.”237 The fees 
and expenses were equally divided.238 Although no financial damages were 
awarded, the message was clear and the investor’s win over the Jordanian 
state still remains relevant.239 
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From multi-million compensation awards and costly interest rates, 
fees, and expenses to legal order and implications, every one of these six 
water related disputes demonstrates that there are high financial stakes in-
volved in international arbitration cases. The cost of non-compliance will 
undoubtedly not be forgotten by states or future direct foreign investors, as 
they continue to enter into international investment treaties. 
B. State Compliance with International Law 
In the second category of outcomes, only three water dispute cases re-
jected the investor’s claims and awarded in favor of the state.240 
In LESI S.p.A. v. Algeria (2007), only after many difficulties involving 
the execution of the work and delays due to security reasons did the host 
state terminate the contract with the private company and launch another 
public bid tender, to which LESI refused to participate. 241  The tribunal 
found that the termination of the construction contract by Algeria did not 
constitute a direct or indirect “expropriation” as alleged by the investor nor 
a violation of the “fair and equitable treatment” provision of the BIT.242 In-
deed, negotiations and compensations were proposed by the state before the 
termination.243 Therefore, all damage claims were rejected and both parties 
had to pay their own costs and expenses.244 The tribunal costs were equally 
divided.245 
In Salini Costruttori S.p.A v. Jordan (2006), the tribunal found that, 
due to a failure to prove the existence of an agreement to arbitration, it was 
not necessary to consider whether Jordan breached the BIT. 246 All claims 
were unanimously rejected. Therefore, the case was awarded in favor of the 
state.247 The arbitral costs and fees were reserved for subsequent determina-
tion.248 
Finally, in Bayview Irrigation District et al. v. United Mexican States 
(2007), the tribunal found that the forty-six Texas claimants had no property 
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rights in the waters in the Mexican portion of the Rio Grande arising out of 
the 1994 NAFTA Treaty, despite the Mexican government’s purposeful and 
systematic capture, seizure and diversion of Rio Grande waters for use by 
local Mexican farmers, which was detrimental to the American investors’ 
water use. 249 According to the tribunal, NAFTA’s chapter eleven does not 
concern “domestic investment” such as in Bayview.250 Therefore, the inves-
tor’s claims did not fall within NAFTA’s scope and the tribunal had no ju-
risdiction on the alleged breach claims, making the host state the winner in 
this particular case.251 The tribunal costs were divided equally between both 
parties and each one had to bear its own costs.252 
These three outcomes in favor of the state prove to be the exception ra-
ther than the norm. Moreover, the last state-won cases followed a construc-
tion contract pattern and did not fall within the classic concession contract 
background found in almost every investor-won dispute. 
C. Pending Cases 
Finally, there are still other water dispute cases that can be listed in a 
third outcomes category. The majority of these cases are still pending, set-
tled, or have been discontinued by both parties themselves. 
1. Decision on Liability 
In two major cases, the tribunal only dispatched a “decision on liabil-
ity,” rendering the dispute as “still pending” in regards to the final damages 
award amount. In AWG Group Ltd. v. Argentine Republic, joint with Suez 
Societad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v. Argentine Republic (2010), 
the tribunal found the host state, Argentina, liable for breach of the BIT.253 
After many concession difficulties arising during the Argentinian economic 
crisis, such as the inadequate tariff regime, inflation rates, refusal of some 
sectors to pay the system charge, higher amounts of water consumption, 
severe measures by local authorities, and new additional taxes, the state ab-
ruptly terminated the concession alleging breaches of the contract by the 
investor.254 Although the “unlawful expropriation” as well as the “full pro-
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tection and security” claims were rejected by the tribunal, Argentina was 
still found liable for breaching the “fair and equitable treatment” provision 
of the BIT.255 Various state actions frustrated the legitimate expectations of 
the investor and therefore constituted breaches of the BITs signed between 
the parties.256 It should also be noted that Argentina’s defense of “state of 
necessity” was rejected.257 The tribunal deferred the “decision on costs and 
expenses until the completeon of the damages phase” of the proceedings. 258 
In Suez Societad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v. Argentine Re-
public (2010),  the concession contract was definitively terminated by local 
authorities after major investments to improve the overall facilities costing 
more than $250 million and severe measures were taken by the authorities 
such as the refusal to apply adjustments on tariff previously agreed to.259 
Subsequently, a new state-owned local company was created to operate the 
water and wastewater services in the province in lieu of the investor’s com-
pany.260 The state was found liable for BIT breaches due to these actions, 
much in the same way as the AWG and Vivendi cases.261 In its decision on 
liability, the tribunal found that Argentina’s actions violated the “fair and 
equitable treatment” provision of the BIT by frustrating the legitimate ex-
pectations of the company’s investment. 262  However, the “expropriation 
without compensation” and “full protection and security” claims were re-
jected.263 The state defense of “state of necessity” was also dismissed.264 
The fees, costs and damages amount were deferred, along with the final 
award.265 
2. Decision on Jurisdiction 
In the Urbaser S.A. v. Argentine Republic (2012), case, the host state 
first prohibited the concession holder from “charging tariffs in conformance 
with its own internal decision-making” and then terminated the conces-
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sion.266 Several categories of breaches of the Argentina-Spain BIT were al-
leged by the foreign investor, such as fair and equitable treatment and un-
lawful expropriation. 267 The investor further claimed more than $100 mil-
lion for damages and compensation, plus interest.268 As of today, the tribu-
nal only dispatched a “decision on jurisdiction” in favor of the investor on 
December 19, 2012, giving it competence to arbitrate the ongoing dis-
pute.269  
D. Settled Cases 
1. Settlement by the Parties 
Three other known water disputes concluded through settlement 
agreements resulting in no further proceedings and no final award or public 
outcome. 
In Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Bolivia (2005), the dispute arose during the 
privatization movement in Bolivia.270 Foreign investors transferred corpo-
rate ownership of privatized assets from the Cayman Islands to the Nether-
lands in order to have access to the Netherlands-Bolivia BIT without the 
permission of Bolivia.271 After strong public opposition to the concession 
contracts in Cochabama, this caused fear of higher rates and prohibitions on 
private wells.272 Finally in April 2000, Bolivian authorities terminated the 
concession. Despite the BIT breaches of “expropriation” claimed by the 
investor, the case was settled and the proceedings were discontinued on 
March 28, 2006.273 
In Aguas Cordobesas S.A. v. Argentine Republic (2010), both parties 
similarly signed a settlement agreement in this thirty-year concession dis-
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pute. 274 On January 24, 2007, the proceedings were discontinued.275 Unfor-
tunately no more public information is available regarding this case.276  
Finally, the waterway construction dispute in JacobsGibb was also set-
tled by the parties. 277 No more public information is available for this case 
as well. 
2. Discontinued Cases 
The outcomes of still two more unfinished water dispute cases may 
never be known. The disputes were discontinued for not paying advances to 
the tribunal. In Branimir v. Slovak Republic, involving a mineral water 
spring project, the tribunal issued an order in 2008 for discontinuance of the 
proceedings for lack of payment. 278 Four years later, in 2012, the exact 
same situation occurred in Azurix Corp v. Argentine Republic involving a 
water and sewerage services concession agreement.279 
Finally, in Neplosky v. Czech Repubclic, the investor, who bought a 
part of the land for water extraction but failed to obtain the permit from lo-
cal authorities, alleged discrimination by the state and a breach of the BIT 
for which he claimed CZK970 million for damages. 280 In 2010, however, 
the investor withdrew his claim and effectively ended the dispute.281 
E. Recent Developments 
In AS Tallinna Vesi v. Estonia, the most recent case concerning a water 
and wastewater services concession, Dutch investors gave notice of arbitra-
tion to Estonia on May 13, 2014 alleging several breaches of the BIT, such 
as fair and equitable treatment and discrimination.282 By refusing to permit 
tariff increases from the regulators for two years despite the fact that Esto-
nian courts have deemed the tariffs part of the services agreement to be an 
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administrative contract, the foreign investor is claiming more than 90 mil-
lion euros of potential damages.283 The case is still pending but further illus-
trates the continued reality of such water disputes.284 The battle between 
water services investors and state contractors continues to roar on with no 
end in sight. As water becomes more scarce and difficult to manage, and 
international investment agreements regarding water services continue to 
increase, the result is a greater need for international investment arbitration.  
This overview of the typology of the diverse water services currently 
and generally involved in the water investment disputes and their particular 
outcomes provide a better general understanding of what constitutes the 
recent wave of water disputes in international investment law. Such disputes 
have amounted to a slow but steady creation of a common regulatory 
scheme surrounding the international water services regime. 
IV. IDENTIFYING THE CLASSIC SCENARIO OF “BLUE GOLD” DISPUTES: 
RECURRING ISSUES AND A COMMON THREAD 
There is a common thread of recurring issues in the majority of the wa-
ter disputes examined in the previous section. 
A. Developing Countries’ Water Policy Under International Review 
Based on the geographic location of the parties presented in each of 
the twenty-one water disputes, it is not difficult to conclude that in almost 
every case, the same group of developing countries tend to be involved. 
Indeed, the majority of the leading water services disputes took place in 
either Argentina, Bolivia or Jordan and in the African countries of Algeria 
and Tanzania.285 All of these states are still considered developing coun-
tries.286 
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are among 
the world’s largest and primary source of loans and development assis-
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tance.287 In the early 1990s, many programs and recommendations involving 
principles of deregulation, market liberalization and privatization of states’ 
assets and services were made, which strongly encouraged developing na-
tions to permit foreign investor companies to manage and run previously 
state-owned water facilities.288 It is clear that these international agencies in 
particular are the forefront to water privatization and continue to wield lever-
age in the developing world.289 
The past twenty years have been plagued by an escalating global water 
crisis.290 Although it is a worldwide phenomenon, certain countries have 
traditionally experienced disproportional negative effects. 291  Since 1990, 
many governments and international communities have tried to find novel 
approaches toward managing water and optimizing resources. 292  Indeed, 
countries with the weakest public sectors have the greatest need for water 
services.293 The new movement in water management toward privatization 
is now seen as an attractive option and solution for public authorities to 
save face and provide their populations with basic water needs.294 Until pri-
vatization, water as a public resource was systematically provided and man-
aged by provincial or municipal government entities around the world.295 
Governments had a moral obligation to ensure access to safe water and ac-
cess to effective water services.296 Beginning in the early 1990s, developing 
countries were faced with a global push towards formal private sector par-
ticipation in water services. 297  Between 1991 and 2000, the number of 
countries with private participators grew from four to thirty-eight, increas-
ing the population served by private companies from 6 million to 96 million 
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in 2000.298 In 2012, some researches showed that in all, more than 205 mil-
lion people in developing countries have been served by a private participa-
tion project at some point since 1990.299 
This trend can be explained by two main reasons. First, as previously 
cited, it was mostly driven by two major international agencies: the World 
Bank and the IMF. They are indeed the source of powerful recommenda-
tions to developing countries to participate in a privatization movement. 
From their point of view, privatization is a promising means of improving 
the weak performance of the water services and utilities, expanding cover-
age, raising the quality and efficiency of services, providing alternative 
ways of infrastructure investment, and reducing the burden on public budg-
ets. 
B. The Nature of Foreign Investment in Water Services Involves  
Much Technology Transfer 
There is yet another reason as to why almost all of the twenty-one 
known water related cases took place in developing countries. Such coun-
tries represent the perfect targets for foreign investment. The developing 
world is made of struggling nations whose capital, financial, and technical 
needs, among others, often make it difficult and sometimes near impossible 
for them to construct adequate infrastructure capable of providing fresh wa-
ter to their citizens. In response to the population demands and moral obli-
gations, developing nations opened their water services market to leading 
international and foreign investment companies.300 
Developing countries are not armed with the resources, whether in the 
form of knowledge, technology or financing, to face such overwhelming 
demand from their growing populations.301 The World Bank estimated that 
water services costs would reach $60 billion annually.302 This is no easy 
task when such countries frequently find themselves in debt and lacking 
sufficient capital.303 Deficient funding leads to difficulties in managing wa-
ter supply and an inability to finance and operate existing facilities.304 
As demand grows, the technological sophistication level for water ser-
vices must increase as well. Advanced technologies and novel infrastructur-
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al concepts are needed to meet demand by handling higher volumes of 
drinkable water. Not every water company, especially those that are state-
owned, have the ability, the capacity or the knowledge to handle these re-
sponsibilities. Additionally, since the UN recognition of a “right to water,” 
the expected standards have increased in terms of access, quality, continu-
ous supply, efficient reuse, diminution of pollution, diminution of water 
losses, overall quality of service, operational efficiency, coverage expan-
sion, tariff levels, water price, treatment processes, infrastructure expansion, 
technological improvements, new management strategies and more. Imme-
diately, it is clear that investing in water facilities is a delicate and subtle 
mission to achieve. Many parameters must be taken into account, which 
results in a laborious, yet often lucrative, investment market. 
Overall, privatization has been viewed as a viable solution for develop-
ing countries in order to meet their water obligations by providing efficient 
water services to their citizens. Privatization simultaneously generates reve-
nue while maximizing efficiencies. For example, Argentina is one of the 
leading developing countries in water arbitration disputes. Argentina repre-
sented one of the largest and most significant global privatization projects 
even amidst a serious economic crisis.305Argentinian authorities had provid-
ed such poor and insufficient water services and wastewater treatment that 
almost half of the city of Buenos Aires had no access to potable water, 
which raised serious health concerns.306 Additionally, access to sewerage 
services was of a poor quality and sometimes even non-existent.307 Almost 
every pipe and water service structure needed to be replaced.308 The tech-
nology to dispose wastewater was antiquated and there were no funds avail-
able to expand or repair the overall services.309 Argentina’s particular situa-
tion could be framed as the classic privatization scenario. Argentina was 
therefore inclined, during the initial stages of water service privatization, to 
enter in a 30-year concession agreement with a French investor for the opera-
tion and management of the country’s water and wastewater services in order 
to be able to finally reach their water obligations owed to its population.310 
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V. RISING TIDE OF A TRIUMVIRATE: THE THREE KEY BREACHES 
Investment agreements enshrine a series of obligations on the parties 
aimed at ensuring a stable and favorable business environment for foreign 
investors.311 These obligations pertain to the treatment that investments are 
afforded in the host country, as well as certain guarantees by foreign inves-
tors certifying their ability to perform key operations related to their in-
vestment.312 
The treatment granted to investors encompasses laws, regulations and 
customs from public entities that apply to, or affect, foreign investors and 
their investments.313 All public entities are bound by international obliga-
tions, including the federal and sub-federal governments, local authorities, 
regulatory bodies, and entities that exercise delegated public powers. 314 
Measures adopted by private actors can also fall under the scope of interna-
tional agreements in exceptional circumstances when such private measures 
can ultimately be attributed to a governmental entity.315 
The set of obligations is rather consistent amongst the majority of bi-
lateral investment agreements.316 The core provisions found in such invest-
ment agreements typically include a most favored nation treatment obliga-
tion, grants of national treatment, obligations to provide fair and equitable 
treatment, protection and security for foreign investors, and an obligation to 
allow international transfers of funds.317 While the substance of these prin-
ciples remains the same throughout many investment agreements, the pre-
cise scope and reach of each obligation depends on the precise wording fea-
tured in each case.318 
 While these diverse provisions may be important to reassure foreign 
investors that they will be able to reap the benefits of their investment, evi-
dence on the extent to which investment treaties actually stimulate invest-
ment is mixed.319 
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A. The Protection of Sanitation and Water Services Against Expropriation 
The protection of foreign investors has historically been the main goal 
of international investment agreements (IIAs). Hence, international agree-
ments include pivotal guarantees against the nationalization or expropria-
tion of foreign investments without compensation.320  
1. The Regulation of Expropriation 
There are significant discrepancies in the way expropriation is defined 
in investment treaties and in countries’ practices. Some IIAs will cover both 
direct and indirect expropriation, whereas some will not address indirect 
expropriation.321  
There is, however, no clear definition of indirect expropriation; despite 
a number of decisions by international tribunals, the line between the con-
cept of indirect expropriation and governmental regulatory measures not 
requiring compensation has not been clearly articulated.322 Rather, it de-
pends on the specific facts and circumstances of the case.323 In recent years, 
a new generation of US and Canadian investment agreements, including the 
investment chapters of FTAs, have introduced specific language and estab-
lished criteria to assist in determining whether an indirect expropriation re-
quiring compensation has occurred.324 Jurisprudence in the last decade has 
demonstrated that the cases of indirect expropriation fall short of the actual 
physical taking of property but that they result in the effective loss of man-
agement, use, control, or a significant depreciation of the value of the assets 
of a foreign investor.325 
Indirect expropriation can be further divided into regulatory takings, 
which are “those takings of property that fall within the police powers of a 
State, or otherwise arise from State measures like those pertaining to the 
regulation of the environment, health, morals, culture, or economy of a host 
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country.”326 The issue of regulatory takings is a particular point of concern 
within many sensitive areas of public policy.327  
There are however, three main criteria that arbitrators are likely to con-
sider in evaluating a measure as recently summarized in Burlington Re-
sources v. Ecuador (2012).328 This decision clarifies the criteria to apply and 
notes that the following requirements must be met in order to find an indi-
rect expropriation: (i) a substantial deprivation of the value of the whole 
investment, i.e., the degree of interference with the property right, including 
interference with the investor’s reasonable investment-backed expectations; 
(ii) a permanent measure, i.e., the duration of the measure; and (iii) a meas-
ure not justified under the police power doctrine, which basically is a re-
view of the measure’s purpose.329 
2. Impact in the Regime of Water Services 
Four breaches of the expropriation concept have been found and inter-
preted in the context of water services over the past twenty or so years. 
These four different cases involved four different factual backgrounds, four 
different water management agreements, and four different kinds of conduct 
or actions that resulted in one and only one decision: undisputed breach of 
“expropriation” without compensation by the state. By briefly defining how 
the expropriation standards applied in these four cases were won by the in-
vestor, it will be easier to understand what constitutes a decisive protection 
for the foreign investor against expropriation, as well as the parallel obliga-
tion upon the host state. 
In ATA Construction, Indus. and Trading Co. v. Jordan (2010), the dis-
pute mainly concerned the validity of a final award annulment by the Jorda-
nian courts.330 The initial case was rendered in favor of the investor, mean-
ing compensation and exoneration from any liability for the dike collapse 
during the filling process; however, the Jordanian court annulled this award 
and extinguished the arbitration agreement, after which the investor initiat-
ed an ICSID proceeding.331 In its final award, the ICSID tribunal found that 
the extinguishment of the investor’s right to have its dispute decided by way 
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of arbitration by local Jordanian courts constituted a clear breach of the 
BIT.332 The investor initially alleged two violations of the BIT, particularly 
the “unlawful expropriation of the [investor’s] claims to money and rights 
to legitimate performance under the contract and the Final Award, and the 
failure to accord fair and equitable treatment to its investment inter alia by 
way of serious and repeated denials of justice by the Jordanian courts.”333 
This case illustrates a specific way of seeking protection against expropria-
tion. Indeed, the facts do not fall into the scope of a classical expropriation, 
which includes a physical occupation of the company or seizure of title.334 
In this case, the Turkish investor simply sought protection against an al-
leged expropriation suffered by both annulment of a final award and perma-
nent denial of its contractual right to arbitrate.335 
The next logical question would be: can serious and repeated denials 
of justice as well as denial of contractual rights constitute an expropriation 
provision under a BIT? The investor argued that the state failed to fulfill 
any conditions for a lawful expropriation provided under the BIT.336 For 
example, it argued that no legitimate public interest was served, the conduct 
of the local courts was discriminatory because it contradicted its consistent 
practice in similar cases, basic procedural rights were denied, and most of 
all, no compensation was provided.337 
In its final decision, the arbitral tribunal had to decide whether the le-
gal actions of the state courts constituted breaches of the BIT.338 Although 
the tribunal declined to exercise jurisdiction regarding the annulment award 
and denial of justice claims for lack for rationae temporis, it clearly stated 
that it had jurisdiction regarding the third claim, the extinguishment of the 
arbitration agreement under the construction contract, which occurred this 
time after the entry into force of the BIT. 339 Within this affirmation, the tri-
bunal unanimously found that this extinguishment was undeniably contrary 
to the Turkey-Jordan BIT.340 In explaining its decision, the tribunal stated 
that the denied right to arbitration was an integral part of the contract and 
therefore constituted an asset of ATA’s investment, as subtly defined in the 
BIT, which had been fully violated by the Jordanian courts. In this way the 
investor was deprived of a valuable asset.341 Without specifically referring 
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to the expropriation provision, the tribunal decided that Jordan violated both 
the letter and spirit of the treaty, implying that the expropriation claim was 
valid.342 The tribunal then ordered Jordanian courts to immediately cease 
interference with ATA’s rights and entitled the investor to further proceed to 
arbitration on the dike dispute, restoring its right to arbitration.343 
This decision is relevant for several reasons. First, it clearly states that 
every right found in the investment contract between the host state and the 
foreign investor represents an asset of its investment, highly protected by 
the BIT.344 Included in these rights is even the right to initiate arbitration 
proceedings.345 Furthermore, this case enlarges the classic definition of ex-
propriation by including the “extinguishment of a valid right to arbitrate” by 
any state court as a form of expropriation precluded under a BIT.346 The 
case also showed the significant ability of the arbitral tribunal to adopt and 
award non-pecuniary compensations when required by the specifics circum-
stances of the dispute.347 
In SAUR International v. Argentine Republic (2014), the tribunal also 
held that there was a breach of the expropriation clause. 348 After two nego-
tiated agreements trying to salvage the concession from its financial diffi-
culties, national authorities decided to intervene and help the investor in 
further managing the business.349 Soon after, the intervention resulted in 
taking full control of the company.350 Contrary to previous negotiations that 
management and administration of the company should return to the inves-
tor’s hands, the provincial governor made a public speech announcing that 
the company was returned to provincial control because of its financial dif-
ficulties.351 Later, the concession contract was terminated unilaterally, alleg-
ing failures of the investor. 352  In the investor’s view, these actions and 
measures constituted clear and repeated intentions to expropriate SAUR’s 
investment, which would be a blatant breach of the BIT.353 The investor 
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argued that this indirect expropriation amounted to more than $143 million 
of damages.354  
In response, the host state rejected every claim.355 Argentina believed 
they did nothing more but use its policy power and concession rights to in-
terfere with management in order to save the concession and protect public 
health.356 If the investor had not failed at fulfilling the aims and expecta-
tions agreed to in the contact, the host state would not have had to interfere 
and ultimately terminate the contract.357 Moreover, Argentina argued that 
the intervention phase was realized in accordance with the concession con-
tract and therefore did not constitute an expropriation contrary to the BIT.358 
Diverse motives such as impairment of the system, failure to achieve the 
general aims of the contract, financial difficulties, and insufficient mainte-
nance would have justified the state’s intervention.359 
The arbitral tribunal had to decide whether the series of measures tak-
en by the host state constituted an indirect expropriation of SAUR’s invest-
ment.360 In its final decision, the tribunal stated that the intervention phase, 
the unilateral termination of the concession, and its transfer to another com-
pany were clear breaches of the BIT and served as an indirect expropriation 
of the investor’s asset.361 To the tribunal, even if the term “measures” is not 
properly described, it must be understood as a broad concept including di-
rect and indirect conduct: legal, economic, or even administrative actions 
committed by an organ of the host state.362 On June 6, 2012, the tribunal 
decided in its decision on liability that Argentina had taken measures and 
actions resulting in the expropriation of SAUR’s investment contrary to the 
BIT signed between both parties.363 This decision enlarges the scope of for-
bidden or unsavory measures by host states within the context of fulfilling 
their BIT obligations and avoiding claims of expropriation.364 
Moreover, in Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentine Re-
public (2007), the French based investor also claimed a violation of “expro-
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priation” without compensation in breach of its BIT.365 In the claimant’s 
perspective, this concept must be broadly interpreted, including any inter-
ference with an investor’s property depriving him of the use or value of its 
investment, directly or indirectly. 366 Therefore, they argue that the prov-
ince’s taking or denial of valuable rights under the concession and the de-
struction of its economic value constitute an expropriation under the BIT.367 
The claimant argued several specific actions taken by the host state to sup-
port its alleged expropriation breach. Such actions included: the denial of a 
10 percent tariff increase previously negotiated and entitled at the end of the 
third year of the concession; the use of its regulatory authority to compel 
the company to stop invoicing customers for certain taxes contrary to the 
instructions; and the unilateral change of the legal framework that governed 
the company and that drastically altered the economic balance of the con-
cession.368 Moreover, the investor argued that the use of the state’s public 
authority to encourage the customers not to pay the bills of the company 
and the state’s continued delivery services after a specific date and ultimate 
termination of the concession amounted to expropriation.369 
In response, Argentina argued the investor’s failure to fulfill the con-
tractual obligations and aims led to the termination of the concession.370 In 
sum, no actions taken by the state were constitutive of a breach of the inter-
national standard of expropriation. 371 In addition, the termination of the 
concession was valid considering the serious violation of the concession 
agreement by the investor.372 
The arbitral tribunal then faced the delicate question of whether the 
specific actions taken by the host state constituted expropriation as set forth 
in the BIT between both parties. 373  The tribunal found that, contractual 
rights, such as pursuing the customer to pay the bills among others, are in-
deed capable of being expropriated.374 The tribunal further stated that all of 
these precise measures taken by the host state were not legitimate regulato-
ry answers to the investor’s failings, but in fact were clear sovereign acts 
designed to end the concession or force its renegotiation.375 Such severe 
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actions were viewed as a campaign against the investor’s business, which 
led to an expropriation even though there was no dispossession of the com-
pany itself.376 
These actions had a similar effect to an expropriation on the disposses-
sion of the claimant’s rights and expectations upon the concession contract. 
The most devastating effect occurred when the recovery rate dramatically 
declined causing unsustainable losses.377 This in turn deprived the investors 
of economic use and enjoyment of their concessionary rights, thus render-
ing the effectiveness of the concession and water services useless.378 The 
tribunal also alluded that the failure alleged by the state, the turbidity epi-
sode, was intermittent and only occurred for a short period of time. 379 
Moreover, it was not harmful, not out of the ordinary, and only affected a 
small number of customers.380 The constant public pressure of the state to 
encourage the unpaid bills was, according to the tribunal, the most im-
portant breach of the BIT.381 This decision further broadened the scope of 
possible actions constitutive of expropriation of a BIT.382 This time, it in-
cluded measures that did not lead to a physical dispossession of the conces-
sion itself, but had a similar effect by destroying the economic viability of 
the concession in a way that rendered it useless.383 
Finally, in Biwater Gauff Ltd. v. Tanzania (2008), Tanzania was found 
liable for expropriation without compensation in breach of the BIT.384 In 
this case, the investor claimed that Tanzania’s repudiation of the contract, 
occupation of the company’s facilities, and deportation of its senior em-
ployees all amounted to a breach of the BIT.385 The claimant argued that 
such direct or indirect actions had the same effect of direct dispossession 
resulting in the effective loss of management, use of control and even de-
preciation of the asset values.386 The accumulation of these actions consti-
tuted an effective expropriation.387 
In response to the allegations, Tanzania argued that the investor 
breached the concession agreement on several occasions. For instance, the 
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investor failed to provide maintenance or to pay the monthly rental fee.388 
This according to Tanzania, entitled the state to take certain measures, such 
as the termination of the contract.389 The state then invoked the ongoing 
crisis at this time to support its measures and allege that the company had 
created a real threat to public health and welfare.390 Finally, the state argued 
that three weeks of financial loss could not be seen as a fundamental depri-
vation of the investment asset leading to expropriation.391 
The tribunal had to evaluate the impact of these actions in stages. The 
tribunal first turned to the international rule that includes direct and indirect 
measures in the scope of expropriation under a BIT.392 Second, the tribunal 
scrutinized the alleged conduct of the host state.393 In this case, the cumula-
tive acts of the state could not be characterized as the ordinary behavior of a 
contractor, which adversely impacted the investor’s rights.394 Indeed, the 
state aggravated the dispute by announcing the repudiation of the contract 
itself during a press release.395 This conduct was an unreasonable disruption 
of the contract between both parties, exclusively motivated by political rea-
sons, and therefore contrary to the BIT provisions.396 The tribunal further 
added that the termination of the concession remained a contractual matter 
to be resolved between both parties.397 
As for the occupation of the facilities and the usurpation of the man-
agement and control, the tribunal decided that the occupation of the facili-
ties and the usurpation of management, as executed with assistance of the 
police force, went far beyond normal contractual behavior.398 Citing various 
international cases in support, the tribunal concluded that these actions 
clearly deprived the investor of its investment, in breach of the BIT.399 
In conclusion, the public termination of the contract, subsequent politi-
cal rally, seizure of the business, deportation of managers, and the final re-
placement with a state-owned corporation amounted to an expropriation of 
Biwater’s investment, regardless of the inevitable termination of the con-
tract and the absence of economic damages.400 This case provides more ex-
amples of state actions that can result in an investment’s expropriation. 
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Here, the tribunal did not take too many liberties in their interpretation, in-
stead relying on international precedent to support its view and final deci-
sion.401 
B. The Fair and Equitable Treatment of Foreign Suppliers of Water 
Services 
Comparative standards of treatment, like the Most Favored Nation 
(MFN) principle, operate through the extension of rights already afforded to 
some investors.402 They do not, however, provide an objective guarantee of 
good treatment toward foreign investors. 403  Therefore, MFN obligations 
would be of little help in cases where all investors were subject to equally 
egregious treatment. 
Absolute standards of treatment are meant to ensure that foreign inves-
tors are granted fair treatment.404 Several formulations are found in BITs that 
intend to express the obligation of the host state to provide a certain minimum 
standard of “good” treatment to foreign investors.405 Many of these formula-
tions relate to the common requirement of ensuring “fair and equitable treat-
ment” to foreign investors.406 
1. The Regulation of Fair and Equitable Treatment 
Tribunals have avoided grand theories about the meaning of the Fair 
and Equitable Treatment (FET) standard. Some authors have endorsed such 
an approach, stating “FET has only one content which is operating at 
different thresholds, depending on the context.”407 These different formula-
tions, however, may lead to different interpretative outcomes.408 
Most commonly, any theoretical discussion is limited to a list of ex-
amples of the kinds of behavior that violate the FET standard.409 Illustrative 
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is the NAFTA award in Waste Management v. Mexico (2004). Here, the tri-
bunal held that FET is violated by conduct that is “arbitrary, grossly unfair, 
unjust or idiosyncratic, is discriminatory and exposes the claimant to sec-
tional or racial prejudice, or involves a lack of due process leading to an 
outcome which offends judicial propriety—as might be the case with a 
manifest failure of natural justice in judicial proceedings or a complete lack 
of transparency and candor in an administrative process.”410 In applying this 
standard, “it is relevant that the treatment which is in breach of representa-
tions made by the host State were reasonably relied on by the claimant.”411 
2. Impact on the on the Water Services Regime 
The host state was found liable for “fair and equitable treatment” 
breach in each of the six disputes mentioned above. A brief review of all the 
cases that involved the FET standard will allow us to better understand how 
this particular guarantee has gained wider protection after each and every 
international case dealing with its application and interpretation. 
In the ATA dispute, there is no express mention of the FET standard in 
the text of Article II of the BIT.412 This is particularly striking seeing as the 
arbitral tribunal found a FET violation413 In this case, the FET standard was 
claimed as an MFN breach under Article II(2) of the BIT,.414 The investor 
argued that the MFN involves a duty of the state to accord FET among oth-
ers, such as the duty not to impair by unreasonable or discriminatory 
measures the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of in-
vestments.415 Again, in the eyes of the investor, the serious denials of jus-
tice, deprivation of procedural rights given by the contract itself, such as the 
extinguishment of the arbitration agreement, were constitutive of unfair and 
unequitable treatment, in violation of its duty.416 
The arbitral tribunal had to face a simple question: are severe denials 
of justice and procedural rights allowing arbitration extinguishment consti-
tutive of a FET breach upon the relevant BIT? The tribunal firmly declared 
that an investment was made of several, mostly inseparable procedural 
rights.417 Later, the tribunal recalled that it is impossible for a state to in-
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voke its national laws to evade BIT obligations.418 The procedural right 
constitutes an asset regarding ATA’s investment and it should benefit from 
the FET protection, as it is mentioned in the preamble of the treaty.419 The 
contract’s termination was found unlawful and therefore constitutive of a 
BIT breach, particularly of the FET standard, which, not to be forgotten, 
was only expressly mentioned in the preamble of the treaty.420 In this case, 
the essence of the FET standard appears to have been extended to include 
extinguishment of an arbitration agreement.421 This case gives a sense that 
the FET protection under a BIT provision is deeper than initially expected. 
Second, in SAUR, the FET standard was part of the breach against the 
host state. Argentina violated the FET standard, according to the claimant, 
by taking several measures in violation of both the concession contract and 
the BIT.422 In response, Argentina claimed that every action undertaken dur-
ing this troubled time was necessary to keep the public water services avail-
able for its citizens and that the host state should not be responsible for the 
commercial risks assumed by the investor.423 
The arbitral tribunal had to face different questions. First, it had to de-
cide the specific meaning of the FET treatment, as found in the present BIT 
between both parties. To begin, the tribunal stated that Article 3 of the BIT 
was a general definition of the FET and that Article 5, the full protection 
standard, was its specific application.424 This point is particularly interesting 
as it shows two standards, as opposed to the traditional view that combined 
both the definition of FET and a possible full protection standard, as alluded 
to in Article 5.1 of the present BIT.425 At this point, it reveals the latitude of 
the arbitrators when interpreting the letter of a BIT. Furthermore, the tribu-
nal also incorporated the concepts of discrimination and arbitrary measures 
as part of the FET and full protection standard.426 The tribunal only exam-
ined the following actions to be relevant when considering the breach: the 
tariff revisions requested by the company which the host state deliberately 
delayed approval of as well as the inexorable termination of the concession 
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by the state.427 These were the decisive actions held by the tribunal in reach-
ing the conclusion that Argentina, by its conduct, breached the FET stand-
ard provided for in Article 3 of the BIT.428 Once again, looking at the out-
come of the case, it appears to be a perfect catalogue of conduct constitutive 
of a FET treatment, and in a way, enlarging the scope of this sometimes-
ambiguous international standard. 
Moreover, a FET breach was found in the complex Azurix Corp. v. Ar-
gentine Republic (2006) dispute as well. 429 In this case, the FET standard 
was not only expressly written down in the text of the BIT but also men-
tioned in the preamble of the treaty.430 In the claimant’s view, several acts 
taken by Argentina led to a FET breach; such as, the refusal to provide nec-
essary information, indefinite delays in verifying information, assertions of 
non-existent policy considerations, requests for unnecessary information, 
manipulation of contract language while ignoring express representations 
during the contracting process, changes of position, and even threats of 
criminal action against the company directors. 431 In response, Argentina 
rejected the investor’s standard FET interpretation and proposed its own.432 
Moreover, the alleged facts were strongly questioned by the state and con-
sidered as rash, vague labels.433 The state argued that the same acts leading 
to an expropriation breach could not be used once again to prove a breach 
of the FET.434 
The arbitral tribunal was then confronted with two primary questions. 
First, what is the true definition and scope of the FET standard, and second, 
what conduct constitutes a breach of FET?435 To answer the first question, 
the tribunal interpreted the ordinary meaning of the terms along with the 
text and purpose of the relevant BIT signed by both parties. The FET should 
be understood, in this case, as treatment in an even-handed and just manner, 
conducive to fostering the promotion of foreign investment at a higher level 
than required by international law.436 Second, and more importantly, the 
tribunal had to consider the alleged actions of the state, and decide whether 
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this type of conduct could constitute a breach of FET.437 In the tribunal’s 
view, several facts were relevant, including: the refusal by the province to 
accept the notice of termination, the unilateral termination by the state (on 
account of abandonment of the concession), the politicized tariff regime, 
and the repeated calls from the province for customers to not pay their 
bills.438 All of these actions were decisive to the tribunal declaring that the 
actions reflected pervasive conduct of the host state in total breach of the 
FET standard. 439  Although the conclusion appears to be clear, the FET 
standard can be tricky to understand because it is so fact-specific. In any 
event, the Azurix case allowed the arbitral tribunal to present its interpreta-
tion of FET and contributed some examples of conduct constitutive of a 
FET breach. 
In Biwater, once again, the FET standard was involved where the in-
vestor claimed a breach of Article 2.2 of the BIT.440 According to the claim-
ants, the FET standard required an obligation of vigilance and protection 
from the state, as well as a commitment to due process, and the promise to 
refrain from conduct which is arbitrary or constitutes a denial of justice.441 
In addition to alleged actions related to the expropriation standard, the in-
vestor also brought up several other actions taken by the state, such as: the 
non-appointment of an independent regulator, the failure to deal with re-
quests to adjust the terms of the contract, the failure to ensure that the gov-
ernment agencies paid their water bills promptly, the failure of the state to 
manage the expectations of the public regarding the speed of improvements 
of the overall network system and more.442 All of these actions were alleged 
as breaches of the FET standard 
Once again, the first issue answered by the arbitral tribunal was 
whether FET is an autonomous standard or whether it is no more than the 
customary international law minimum standard.443 Indeed, as the tribunal 
noted, the expression itself has different meanings depending on the terms 
of the individual treaty involved.444 Interpreting the Tanzania-United King-
dom BIT spirit and letter, the tribunal concluded that the parties intended to 
adopt an autonomous standard as no reference to the customary law was 
made.445 If the parties had wanted to refer to it, it should have been express-
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ly written; without any reference to customary international law, the FET 
standard becomes autonomous.446 Having said that, the tribunal admitted 
that the difference between the two meanings was more than thin, giving the 
arbitrators much latitude regarding its interpretation in each case.447 Its am-
biguous nature gives the tribunal the possibility to articulate a range of prin-
ciples, such as protection of legitimate expectations, transparency, con-
sistency non-discrimination, and good faith, in order to reach the required 
FET protection.448 
The next question was whether the circumstances alleged were inequi-
table and thus a breach of the BIT.449 Several acts were relevant in finding a 
breach of the FET by the state. Such actions included: the provincial gover-
nor’s press conference, the seizure of the company offices, the deportation 
of its senior management, the installation of the provincial authorities in the 
company, and the failure to manage the expectations of the public, regard-
ing the speed of improvements to the overall network that in effect under-
mined the public confidence in the company and the concession during var-
ious public speeches.450 After a discussion on the essence of the ambiguous 
yet versatile concept of FET, giving us more insight as to its meaning in the 
context of water services concessions, this case exposed conduct that states 
should avoid in order not to breach their international investment treaty 
provisions and obligations.451 This case illustrates one more time how the 
FET can be applied, interpreted, and understood in the water services con-
text and what conduct can constitute a breach of FET provided in a BIT. 
Furthermore, in the Vivendi water dispute, the concept of FET was in-
terpreted in a similar context. In this case, the investor was claiming a 
breach of Articles 3 and 5.1 of the BIT.452 In the claimant’s view, various 
actions and omissions of the state were constitutive of a FET breach. The 
investor claimed to have been systematically deprived of its bilateral rights 
upon the BIT.453 To support these allegations, the investor provided proof of 
specific actions and omission of the host state.454 Such evidence included: 
the imposition of unilateral tariffs contrary to the terms of the concession; 
use of media to generate hostility in the citizenry towards the investor’s 
business; incitation of customers to not pay their bills; forcing a concession 
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renegotiation and rejecting possible solutions; compelling the provision of 
services for a time after the first termination of the concession by the inves-
tor; and a pattern of harassment to prevent the investor from pursuing law-
suits.455 All of these acts, according to the tribunal constituted a breach of 
FET, as well as an expropriation breach as seen in the previous section.456 
In response, the state argued that this case was entirely contractual and 
that the tribunal had no jurisdiction.457 The state alleged that the investor 
had failed to comply with the terms of their agreement such as increasing 
tariffs abruptly rather than gradually.458 Finally, the state maintained that in 
this situation, to protect the drinkable water and sewage services of the 
population, the province had a legitimate right to act and therefore, there 
was no FET breach459 
In its final award, the tribunal faced several issues. First, it had to in-
terpret the scope, content, and true essence of the FET standard desired un-
der the Argentina-France BIT.460 The tribunal noted that the principle was 
already present in both parties’ minds during the preamble process of their 
treaty.461 The text suggests a broader interpretation of the standard, which 
invites consideration of a wide range of other international principles, such 
as good faith and transparency.462 The tribunal also considered Article 5.1, 
which concerned the full protection and security standard.463 It is clear that 
in this case, both of these principles were intimately linked. Both principles 
appear to be mixed in the arguments of both of the parties as well as the 
tribunal’s. 
Some actions undertaken by the state where specific FET references 
were made, even where applicable to the full protection and security con-
cept, also pertain to the FET treatment in general.464 For example, enforced 
renegotiation of concessions as well as threats of rescission based on vari-
ous allegations and after depriving the investor’s billings of formal legiti-
macy clearly constitute inequitable conduct amounting to a BIT breach.465 
According to the FET standard, undercutting a concession that has been 
properly granted constitutes unfair and inequitable treatment.466 Here, the 
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provincial governor made several public speeches criticizing and undermin-
ing the investor’s business.467 Furthermore, the prohibition of the compa-
ny’s ability to pursue its collection lawsuits or enforce its judgments also 
served as conduct amounting to a breach of FET.468 This case provides a 
number of paradigmatic examples of state action constitutive of FET viola-
tion. 
Finally, in Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic (2011), the investor 
claimed that Argentina failed to treat the claimant’s investment equitably, 
and thus breached Article 2.2 of the BIT.469 The claimant delivered a list of 
actions and omissions by the host state to support his claim during arbitra-
tion. Such examples include: the early repudiation of the state commitments 
and obligations under the concession contract that prevented the investor 
from generating expected revenues; delays when delivering to wastewater 
treatment plants; delays and a refusal to update the categorization of the 
company’s customers; and preventing the use of a more current valuation 
methodology in order to calculate the water price.470 Even worse, however, 
the province enacted emergency legislation in 2002 depriving the investor 
of all its fundamental and legal concession rights.471 The most destructive 
consequence of this legislation was the elimination of the right to calculate 
the tariff in US dollars. Instead, the peso was devalued at an artificial rate, 
reducing the revenues by two-thirds.472 Moreover the province attempted to 
force renegotiation of the concession right before terminating it, alleging 
obligation failures from the company, in order to return the water conces-
sion back into public hands.473 
In response to these allegations, Argentina argued that every action it 
undertook sufficed as an emergency measure in response to the serious fi-
nancial crisis it faced at the time.474 The state further argued that the inves-
tor knew how fragile and unstable a condition both the state and its water 
services sector was in prior to its involvement.475 For this reason, according 
to Argentina, the state cannot be responsible for the risks assumed by the 
investor itself.476  
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Upon review of the dispute, the tribunal declared, that as it is written in 
the BIT at issue, the FET standard was meant to give an adequate protection 
to the investor’s reasonable expectations.477 This protection does not mean, 
however, that the investor is absolutely assured against any changes in the 
legal framework of the host state, especially not in a time of crisis.478 The 
investor does, however, remain protected against unreasonable modifica-
tions.479 The crucial actions by the state in the tribunal’s point of view were 
those occurring when the emergency legislation was enacted, such as: the 
requirement that fees and bills be paid in pesos and not in US dollars; that 
water price calculated in devaluated Argentinian peso was detrimental to the 
investor’s business; the new regulatory framework concerning drinkable 
water and wastewater services was unfavorable to the company; and finally, 
the reluctance to renegotiate the concession.480 All of these actions informed 
the tribunal’s finding that Argentina had failed to restore a reasonable equi-
librium to the concession.481 Additionally, the tribunal held that Argentina 
had aggravated its situation so much that it constituted a clear breach of 
FET upon the BIT signed with the investor.482 This water dispute represent-
ed yet another factual scenario of a potential FET breach, thus providing 
much more substance, with diverse examples of actions, to the FET analysis 
in the context of water services. 
Looking at all the FET breach cases, there is no doubt that this juris-
prudence is slowly giving birth to a more precise definition of the FET in-
ternational economic law standard. 
C. The Full Protection and Security Guaranteed to Water Services 
One of the key substantive provisions commonly included in invest-
ment treaty texts is the obligation to provide “full protection and security.” 
Different variants in phrasing also exist, such as: “protection and security,” 
“protection in accordance with fair and equitable treatment,” or “legal secu-
rity.”483 
1. The Principle of Full Protection and Security 
Saluka Investments B.V. v. Czech Republic (2006) explains that the 
“full protection and security” standard applies when the foreign investment 
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has been affected by civil strife and physical violence.484 It is clear that tri-
bunals are in agreement that the standard applies at least in situations where 
actions of third parties involving either physical violence or the disregard of 
legal rights occurs.485 It further requires that the state exercise due diligence 
to prevent harm to the investor.486 The standard is commonly understood to 
not grant the investor an “insurance against all and every risk,” as was re-
cently noted in Vanessa Ventures v. Venezuela (2008).487 Although the host 
state is required to exercise an objective minimum standard of due dili-
gence, the standard of due diligence for purposes of these cases is consid-
ered that of a host state in the circumstances and with the resources of the 
particular state in question.488 More recently, the scope of the full protection 
and security concept has been extended to provide “a legal framework that 
offers legal protection to investors including both substantive provisions to 
protect investments and appropriate procedures that enable investors to vin-
dicate their rights” and which offers a rich canvas against which foreign 
investors in the water sector may prepare their claims.489 
2. Impact in the Regime of Water Services 
Only four water disputes over the past twenty years have resulted in a 
“full protection and security” BIT breach. A review of the specific facts and 
tribunal interpretations of each case exposes the contours of the emerging 
full protection standard and sheds light on the types of attitudes and actions 
that may be construed as a breach. 
First, in Azurix, Argentina was found liable for breach of full protec-
tion and security provision of the BIT, among others.490 In its memorial, the 
claimant, an American investor, argued that the standard of full protection 
and security imposes an obligation of vigilance and due diligence upon the 
government.491 Furthermore, such an obligation goes beyond physical pro-
tection or basic police functions, to protections from acts such as adminis-
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trative actions, political actions or again amendment of its law.492 In the pre-
sent situation, the investor alleged that the host state breached the standard 
by failing to apply the regulatory framework of the concession agreement, 
including failures to revoke concession resolutions and to decide adjustment 
or valuations.493 In short, the claimant maintained that the state failed to 
take any actions to protect the investment, and that such an omission neces-
sarily implied a breach of the full protection and security obligation.494 In 
response, the state argued that the investor simply claimed this contractual 
dispute in arbitral court for the sole purpose of obtaining the BIT protec-
tion.495 The host state further maintained that the dispute was not related to 
an investment at all.496 Moreover, according to the state, no specific actions 
had been rightfully claimed, only omissions, which are ordinarily not in-
cluded within standard BIT protection, which requires active behavior in the 
duty of care.497 
Neither active behavior nor basic police functions were involved in 
Azurix. The only relevant facts were the failures of the state to apply the 
regulatory framework initially negotiated into their water concession 
agreement.498 The tribunal, therefore, faced the delicate question of whether 
“full protection and security” as written into the relevant BIT is limited to 
active behavior of the state. To answer this question, the tribunal carefully 
interpreted Article II(2)(a) of the BIT.499 First, the tribunal noted that in 
some treaties, the full protection and fair and equitable treatment appears as 
a single standard.500 This, however, was not the case in Azurix. The two 
phrases in the treaty clearly indicate two distinct obligations.501 Moreover, 
the tribunal declared that the BIT signed between Argentina and Azurix was 
understood to go beyond physical actions or security and that the stability of 
the investment was simply another form of full protection, which was just 
as important to the investors.502  Though the United States had previously 
signed other agreements with Uruguay limiting the scope of the full protec-
tion standard, these would have no impact on the present dispute because 
here the phrasing of the Article had no other adjective or explanation.503 
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Therefore, the provision reasonably extended the Article’s coverage to more 
than physical actions when applying the concession’s regulatory frame-
work, such as to omissions.504 These omissions thus constituted a failure to 
assure full protection and security of Azurix’s investment.505 
The tribunal’s conclusion is highly relevant for several reasons. The 
actual text and phrasing of a BIT will be literally interpreted. If the state 
wants to limit the scope of the full protection standard, it has to specifically 
include a provision in the BIT.506 This case confirmed the notion that stand-
ard limitations must be clearly expressed in BITs and that omissions may be 
considered in determining breach of a BIT relating to service conces-
sions.507 
The full protection standard was again part of Argentina’s liability in 
the Vivendi case.508 The French investors claimed they were systematically 
attacked and deprived of their rights under their BIT by the host state.509 
The investors pointed to several specific actions undertaken by the host 
state, such as: the imposition of unilaterally modified tariffs that were con-
trary to the terms of the concession; the use of media to create hostility 
within the population towards the investors; inciting the population to not 
pay their bills; forcing the renegotiation of the concession; rejecting, in bad 
faith, proposals that could have saved the agreement and the overall water 
services system.510 These alleged attacks destroyed the economic value of 
the concession, thereby forcing the investor to terminate the agreement.511 
The state then forced the investor to continue providing services for ten ad-
ditional months before the final termination of the concession. 512  The 
claimant further argued that the harassment from the state continued even 
after the end of the water services contract.513 The claimant thus not only 
argued a breach of full protection standard for passive behavior, but also 
that the standard extended beyond physical security to encompass security 
against harassment that damages the functionality of an investor’s compa-
ny.514 
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The state viewed these actions and omissions as only involving con-
tractual matters, under which the arbitral tribunal had no jurisdiction.515 The 
state likewise argued that the treaty rights and the controlling interest in the 
local company were acquired unlawfully, therefore precluding the investor 
to any BIT claim.516 Additionally, the host state contended that the popula-
tion was revolting and not paying their bills due to their loss of confidence 
in the water services system as a result of poor water quality and delivery.517 
The state believed that it had the right and responsibility to take steps to 
ensure availability of safe affordable and accessible water to its popula-
tion.518 Finally, the state rejected the interpretation imposing a general duty 
to ensure a stable and predictable business or fiscal environment. The state 
thus supported a limitation to physical interferences or actions.519 
In its final decision, the tribunal decided that the text of Article 5.1 was 
not limited to physical actions. If the parties wanted to limit the scope of the 
provision, they should have included specific language expressing such in-
tent.520 Without this type of language, any kind of act or measure including 
those harming the functional business of the investors, as in the present 
case, may constitute a breach of full protection under the BIT.521  
Interestingly, the tribunal found there was a breach of the FET standard 
in addition to the breach of full protection and security.522 This suggests that 
the two standards, although expressly written in two separate articles, are in 
fact intimately linked.523 The Vivendi decision enlarged the scope of what 
constitutes a full protection and security provision in the singular context of 
water services.524 The tribunal’s interpretation included any kind of acts, 
measures or conduct possibly harming in any way, economically, physically 
or politically the investors’ business and the company providing the water 
services.525 
In both Azurix and Vivendi, the full protection and security standard 
were significantly expanded with the addition of two kinds of actions con-
stitutive of a BIT breach in the water services context: a state’s omission of 
guarantees to fully protect the investment and conduct towards an investor 
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that harms the functionality of the investor’s business.526 These two cases 
provide examples of actions that host states should avoid when dealing with 
private investors in the water sector so as to adequately and legally fulfill 
their provisions under the relevant BIT. 
In the third case, Impregilo, the final decision on the full protection 
and security was more complex. Indeed, the international standard does not 
immediately stand out while reading the different written provision under 
the Argentina-Italy BIT. The concept of full protection cannot be found sep-
arately from the related FET, and not a single line of the provision men-
tioned full protection and security.527 As we have seen previously, however, 
the interpretation and definition of this standard must be closely considered 
with any analysis of a potential FET breach.528 
In the claimant’s view, the same facts that led to an FET breach also 
led to a breach of “full protection and security.”529 This case draws a rele-
vant point, clearly stating that under the Argentina-Italy BIT, the concept of 
FET and full protection were not separate standards, but intimately bound, 
so much that, a breach of one will almost automatically amount to a viola-
tion of the other.530 In its eighty-eight page award, the tribunal spent only 
six lines discussing the alleged full protection standard breach.531 After a 
long and detailed interpretation of the FET breach, the tribunal simply stat-
ed that where a FET breach was already established, it was not necessary to 
examine whether there was a breach of the full protection standard.532 Here, 
according to the tribunal, FET breaches already constitute failures to ensure 
full protection.533 These words clearly support the fact that in this specific 
BIT, both of these international standards were viewed as inexorably linked 
together.534 
Finally, in Biwater, Tanzania was found liable for full protection and 
security breach.535 The investor argued that the state had an obligation of 
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due diligence to protect its investment against physical assault, such as civil 
strife and physical violence under the full protection provision.536 Similarly, 
the investor maintained that Tanzania, by its actions, failed to safeguard the 
physical integrity of its investment against interference by use of force.537 
The alleged actions of the state included: the usurpation of management and 
control of the investor’s water services company; the termination of the 
concession and the new state owned replacement at a staff meeting; the re-
moval of the company manager under serious threat of deportation; and fi-
nally, the occupation and seizure of the entire water services facilities and 
business.538 All of these actions were viewed as forcible physical interfer-
ences in the investor’s company.539 Additionally, the claimant argued that 
the full protection and security standard, as negotiated in their BIT, “includ-
ed a protection from interference with the basic legal framework upon 
which the investor relied to make its investment.”540 The investor’s basic 
expectation was that the concession contract would be performed in good 
faith, and this expectation was not met.541  
In response to these allegations, the host state argued that the investor 
wrongfully distinguished between the FET provision and the full protection 
standard by enlarging their scope by including the obligation of legal pro-
tection and full security in addition to physical actions.542 The state also 
contended that the purported termination of the concession during the staff 
speech did not constitute a breach of the BIT, since it was not intended to be 
a termination.543 In addition, the state attempted to limit the scope of the 
diligence standard by claiming that the standard only applied to the use of 
force from outside actors, such as civil war, riots, or natural disasters.544 The 
state also refused to characterize the scheduling of the staff meeting as us-
ing force, thus denying any effects on physical integrity on the claimant’s 
investment by stating that no quantifiable damages could be found.545 The 
state further argued that the investor did not possess the assets and by refus-
ing to give them up, the state had no choice but to seize the services.546 De-
spite that, no physical force was used and the deportation threats were made 
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to protect the water supply and sewage system.547 Finally, according to Tan-
zania, the scope of the full protection standard should not be seen as a strict 
liability.548 Rather, the state viewed the standard as more of a duty of dili-
gence expected from a civilized nation that may be limited when authorities 
act to protect water services and distribution to their people, particularly in 
times of crisis.549 
In its decision, the tribunal expressed the meaning of full protection 
and security and affirmed both the “duty of diligence” and protection of the 
“physical integrity of an investment against the use of force” concepts.550 
The tribunal cited to and adopted the view of the Azurix case, concluding 
that full protection standard protects beyond strict physical force.551 The 
tribunal enlarged the scope of the protection beyond physical force by add-
ing commercial, financial and legal guarantees of stability.552 It would be 
“unduly artificial,” according to the tribunal, to confine the essence and 
scope of this international standard. 553 Moreover, the tribunal refused to 
limit the protection to the state’s duty to protect against interference by third 
parties.554 Rather they extended an obligation to organs of the host state it-
self, as the word “full” clearly intended.555 
In conclusion, unnecessary and abusive acts by the state, even without 
the use of force, represent a clear breach of the full protection and security 
standard under the related BIT, even if no quantifiable damages are found 
or proven.556 The Biwater case added a third kind of action to the full pro-
tection breach called the “unreasonable or discriminatory measures” stand-
ard, which includes threats.557 These cases provide important guidelines and 
types of actions for states to avoid in an effort to faithfully adhere to both 
current and future BITs and state water service concession contracts. 
CONCLUSION: THE EMERGENCE OF AN INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR 
SANITATION AND WATER SERVICES 
The last decade has witnessed a dramatic surge of investment disputes 
between foreign investors and host country governments. Arbitral panels 
have been charged with the task of applying the rules of international in-
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vestment agreements in specific cases, a task that is not often straightfor-
ward given the broad and ambiguous terms of these agreements. This new 
phenomenon of investment litigation has resulted in a number of decisions 
from arbitral tribunals in the water service sector. Such decisions have con-
tributed to the formation of an embryonic water service jurisprudence and 
the elucidation of key provisions, concepts, and definitions embedded in 
BITs and water service-related concession contracts. All of this has led to 
the emergence of a nascent framework for global economic regulation of 
the sanitation and water services industry. 
The definition of investment is currently absorbing sanitation and wa-
ter services, a rather new form of investment in the transnational scenario. 
Furthermore, international investment law is growing flexible enough to 
attract these specific types of highly sensitive disputes. International in-
vestment treaties and the tribunal in charge of applying these rules have 
contributed significantly in shaping the contours and substance of an inter-
national water service jurisprudence and the emerging international eco-
nomic water services regime. The investment world fills a gap that no other 
organization has been able to address.  
While an investment tribunal’s main task is to apply treaties, which 
protect foreign investors, the same tribunals may not be well equipped to 
consider non-economic issues, such as those essential to the water regula-
tion industry.558 Although the investment jurisprudence may be seen as pro-
gress towards the regulation of an important service, it also emphasizes the 
lack of a more global holistic approach to regulating water services and ac-
cess to water. Future research will have to find a means of reconciling the 
great advances made in the area of investment with the urgent need of en-
suring that the more nascent human right to water receives equal considera-
tion in the coming years. 
On a more practical level, water services are no longer solely under the 
purview of domestic regulation. International investment agreements apply 
by default, particularly in the absence of World Health Organization stand-
ards. The international investment regime further contributes to the interna-
tionalization of the water services regime. Conversely, governments must 
design water related policies that comply with fair and equitable treatment, 
expropriation regulation, and full protection and security, since not doing so 
can be costly and deter foreign investors from providing high quality ser-
vices. Or, if policy makers do not agree with such a reality, they must re-
design and re-engineer the applicable international law. 
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Both the theoretical and practical conclusions drawn by this Article an-
ticipate future developments and assist in exposing the horizon of forthcom-
ing research and debate in the global governance of sanitation and water 
services. The increasing need for water due, inter alia, to global warming 
and climate change and new technologies means that foreign investments in 
water will increase and will create more proactive approaches in thinking 
and designing the international principles that regulate water. 
 
   
 
